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LIBERALISM AND TORT LAW: ON THE CONTENT AND ECONOMIC EFFICIENCY OF A LIBERAL 
COMMON LAW OF TORTS 
 





This Article has three parts. Part I begins by delineating the protocol one should use to determine 
whether a society is an immoral society, an amoral society, a goal-based society of moral 
integrity, or a rights-based society of moral integrity (i.e., a society that engages in a bifurcated 
prescriptive-moral practice that strongly distinguishes moral-rights claims [about the just] from 
moral-ought claims [about the good], that is committed to the lexical priority of the just over the 
good, and that fulfills its commitments to some hard-to-specify, requisite extent). Part I then 
proceeds to outline the protocol one should use to determine the moral norm that any particular 
rights-based society is committed to using to derive moral-rights conclusions. It next provides an 
account of the liberal moral norm that I think our rights-based society is committed to 
instantiating. It argues that this norm commits us to treating all creatures that have the 
neurological prerequisites to lead a life of moral integrity (to take their moral obligations 
seriously and to take seriously as well the dialectical task of choosing a conception of the good 
and leading a life that is consonant with that conception) with appropriate, equal respect and to 
showing appropriate, equal concern for such creatures, in part for their welfare as economists 
understand that concept but primarily for their having a meaningful opportunity to lead a life of 
moral integrity. Part I concludes by examining the implications of our society's liberal 
commitments for (1) the tort-related moral duties and rights of its members and participants and 
(2) the general tort-related duties of its governments and the more specific duties of our society's 
courts when adjudicating common-law tort cases. This account proceeds from a premise 
uncongenial to economics that, from the perspective of liberalism, not all effects are 
commensurable - viz., that any tendency of a choice to deprive moral-rights holders on balance 
of a meaningful opportunity to lead a life of moral integrity by killing them, depriving them of 
the neurological prerequisites for leading a life of moral integrity, subjecting them to life-





that they are the authors of their own lives cannot be offset by any tendency the choice has to 
increase "mere utility" or "welfare" as economists understand that term. Part I argues inter alia 
that (1) its claim that ours is a liberal, rights-based society and (2) its account of the implications 
of that fact for the obligations of our society's members, participants, and common-law judges 
provide a normative grounding both for something like the Hand formula for negligence and for 
the common law's treatment of ultrahazardous activities.  More specifically, Part 1 argues that 
liberalism implies that (1) something like the Hand formula for negligence is the appropriate 
standard for determining tort liability for possibly-tortious choices made by individuals who 
knew or should have known that their choices should be expected to impose net equivalent-dollar 
losses on others that reflect “mere-utility losses” the relevant victims sustained and (2) 
individuals who made possibly-tortious choices they knew or should have known should be 
expected to disserve the interests of some others in having a meaningful opportunity to lead a life 
of moral integrity are liable in tort unless their choices served the on-balance interests of the 
society’s members and participants in having an opportunity to lead such a life. 
 
Part 2 then examines whether a common law of torts that seeks solely to secure liberal 
corrective-justice rights will be economically efficient. More specifically, Part 2 delineates and 
explores twelve reasons why the correct resolution of a liberal corrective-justice claim may not 
be economically efficient.  
 
Finally, Part 3 identifies and analyzes the moral status (inter alia, the moral legitimacy) and 
likely generic desirability (moral-rights considerations aside) of the various possible non-
common-law components of the positive tort law of a liberal, rights-based State—i.e., of its 





                                                
 
LIBERALISM AND TORT LAW: ON THE CONTENT AND ECONOMIC EFFICIENCY OF A LIBERAL 
COMMON LAW OF TORTS 
 
© 2005 Richard S. Markovits 
 
 
 This Article analyzes 
(1) the proper way to determine the general moral character, the general moral type, 
and the specific moral commitments of any society; 
 
(2) the general content of liberal moral commitments; 
 
(3) the tort-law-related corollaries of a liberal, rights-based society’s commitments—
i.e., the implications of liberalism for the moral and legal tort-related rights and/or 
obligations of a liberal, rights-based society’s members, participants, and 
governments, 
 
(4) the reasons why judges in those liberal, rights-based societies that have a common 
law of torts are obligated to resolve common-law tort cases in favor of a plaintiff 
if and only if he has a corrective-justice1-based right of redress against the 
defendant (who had harmed him wrongfully by making a tortious choice that 
violated the defendant’s liberal moral obligations to the plaintiff); 
 
(5) the economic efficiency of the common law of torts of a liberal, rights-based 
society; and 
 
(6) the moral status from a liberal perspective and the generic desirability (moral-
rights considerations aside) of the various possible non-common-law components 
of the tort law of a liberal, rights-based society. 
 
 The Article has three parts.  Part 1 focuses on the first four issues in the preceding list.  
Part 2 delineates and explains twelve reasons why a body of tort law that is exclusively oriented 
toward securing wronged tort victims’ corrective-justice tort rights may not be economically 
efficient.  And Part 3 analyzes the relationship between the possible constitutional, statutory, 
 
1 In standard usage, “corrective justice” requires that “individuals who are responsible for the wrongful 
losses of others have a duty to repair the losses.”  See Jules Coleman, Tort Law and Tort Theory: Preliminary 
Reflections on Method in Philosophy and the Law of Torts (Gerald Postema, ed.) 183, 184 (2001).  In this study, I 
will use the expression “corrective-justice-related” duties to refer not only to this duty of repair but also to the duty 
of members of a rights-based State not to commit the wrongs that can give rise to a corrective-justice duty of repair 
and to the duties of the government(s) of a rights-based State to prevent such wrongs, to secure compensation for 





administrative-regulation, and judicially-legislated components of the positive tort law of a 
liberal, rights-based society and that society’s moral commitments and offers some brief 
comments on the relative generic attractiveness (rights-consideration aside) of the non-
corrective-justice-oriented legislation that legislatures, administrative agencies, and judges are 
likely to create. 
 Before proceeding, I want to make four preliminary observations.  First, many 
philosophically-oriented analyses of tort law focus on formal elements of corrective justice 
without ever discussing the grounding or content of the substantive moral right whose violation 
gives rise to a concrete corrective-justice claim.  This Article focuses primarily on the grounding 
and content of the moral rights whose existence corrective-justice claims presuppose. 
 Second, although the moral and possible legal tort-related corollaries of liberalism will 
clearly be of more interest if, as I claim, ours is a liberal, rights-based society, one might be 
interested in liberalism’s tort-related implications even if no actual society were a liberal, rights-
based society.  Readers who reject my conclusions about our society’s general moral type, 
general moral character, and specific moral commitments and/or my claims about those 
conclusions’ implications for the internally-right answer to some legal-rights questions may 
therefore still be interested in the Article’s analyses of (1) the implications of liberalism for the 
way in which private actors should behave in situations in which their choices might be tortious, 
(2) the implications of liberalism for the choices that common-law judges and other officials of a 
liberal, rights-based State are obligated to make, and (3) the reasons why the tort-related private 
and State choices that liberalism recommends may not be allocatively efficient. 
 Third, some readers may understandably be troubled by my handling of the various fits 
and non-fits between (1) my accounts of (A) liberalism and (B) its tort-related corollaries on the 
one hand and (2)(A) the positive common law of torts in the United States2 and (B) various 
normative positions at least some Americans take on related issues on the other hand.  Such 
readers may complain that I am trying to have it both ways.  Thus, in the one direction, I proudly 
announce the fact that my account of liberalism fits various legal doctrines and social beliefs.  
For example, I trumpet the fact that my account of liberalism’s implications for the moral 





                                                                                                                                                            
may harm others in ways that do not deprive them of a meaningful opportunity to lead a life of 
moral integrity (that may impose what I will call “mere utility” losses on them) not only fits (at 
least a cleaned-up version of) the Hand formula for negligence but provides a moral grounding 
for that legal doctrine.  Similarly, I take some pride in the fact that my account of liberalism’s 
implications for the moral obligations of potential injurers who are considering choices that may 
harm others in ways that would deprive them of a meaningful opportunity to lead a life of moral 
integrity would provide a normative justification for the RESTATEMENT (SECOND’S) conclusion 
about the liability of owners of “ultrahazardous activities.”  At least, my account of liberalism 
will ground this RESTATEMENT conclusion if the key expressions in the relevant RESTATEMENT 
provisions (“abnormally dangerous” and “low value” to the community) were given plausible 
though non-standard interpretations—i.e., if the RESTATEMENT provision is read to state that 
injurers whose (ultrahazardous) activities are “abnormally dangerous” in the sense of creating a 
risk that they may deprive someone of the opportunity to lead a life of moral integrity are liable 
for the losses such activities cause even if their avoidance-move rejections would not be deemed 
negligent by the conventional Hand formula unless their choices did not on balance disserve the 
interest of the relevant population in having such an opportunity (were otherwise of sufficiently 
“high value” to the community in the sense of promoting such opportunities in other ways to 
make them morally desirable when evaluated through the application of such an opportunity-to-
lead-a-life-of-moral-integrity metric).  And again, I take some comfort in the fact that the self-
conception-oriented corollary of liberalism I articulate (which focuses on the importance of 
individuals’ feeling that they are the authors of their own lives) provides a liberal justification for 
at least some libertarian conclusions about the liberty rights of moral-rights holders. 
 In the other direction, some readers may feel that I am insufficiently intellectually 
disturbed by various non-fits between my account of the legal implications of liberalism and our 
positive law of torts or the more general way in which the governments of our society have 
responded to tort contingencies.  If anything, such readers might claim, I treat these non-fits not 
as evidence against my conclusions about our society’s moral commitments and/or their 
common-law-of-torts corollaries but as evidence of these conclusions’ practical importance—
i.e., argue that the existence of such non-fits enhances the value of my analysis by creating the 
 





possibility that it might lead to improvements in our society’s conduct.  Although there is 
something to this accusation, it tells only part of the story.  In fact, I do regret these non-fits (1) 
not just because, as a liberal, I regret the reality they manifest (our society’s failure to instantiate 
liberal norms) but also (2) because I recognize that their existence disfavors either or both my 
conclusion that our society is a liberal, rights-based society and/or my conclusions about the 
content of the common law of torts of a liberal, rights-based State and the more general tort-
related obligations of the governments of a liberal, rights-based State. 
 However, I admit that I find the relevant non-fits less damaging to my position than many 
readers might, at least on first thought, consider them to be.  In part, my assessment of the 
significance of such non-fits reflects my conclusion that, to be justified, my conclusions about 
the moral type, moral character, and specific moral commitments of our society need not fit the 
conduct, beliefs, and perceptions of our society’s members and governments perfectly.  They 
need only (1) discounted-fit these facts better than do any alternative conclusions about  our 
society’s moral character and specific moral commitments (where the weight of a non-fit is 
discounted by its explicability—see below) and (2) discounted-fit these facts well enough to 
justify the conclusion that our society has moral integrity (is a society that has commitments that 
deserve to be called “moral” and fulfills these commitments well enough to deserve to be called 
“a society of moral integrity”—see below again).  And, in part, my assessment of the damage 
these non-fits do to my position reflects my conclusion that, although legal realities are relevant 
to the “empirical” analyses of “discounted fit” on which conclusions about a society’s moral 
type, moral character, and specific moral commitments must be based, such data form only a tiny 
percentage of the social facts from which such conclusions should be derived.  Most of the 
relevant data relates to the prescriptive-moral claims, arguments, conclusions, perceptions, and 
conduct that people make, reach, have, and engage in outside of legal fora, frequently when—for 
transaction-cost-related or other reasons—there is no possibility that a legal claim will ever be 
made.  Legal academics are far too inclined to believe that only arguments and decisions that are 
made in courts or legislatures are relevant to determining the internally-right answer to a legal-
rights issue.  This Article both argues for and proceeds from a contrary conclusion. 
 The fourth and final observation I want to make at this juncture relates to the extent of the 





the one direction, I want to point out that—to my mind—our liberal commitments do obligate us 
to change a good deal not only of our tort law but also of our tort-related conduct.  Think, for 
example, of the number of contemporary decisions that violate the corollary of liberalism (see 
below) that choices that create the possibility that some member of or participant in our society 
may lose the opportunity to lead a life of moral integrity (by creating a risk that he may be killed, 
deprived of the neurological prerequisites for acting as a moral agent, subjected to life-
dominating pain, or perhaps induced to reject the belief that he is the author of [and hence is 
responsible for] his own life) are moral-rights-violative unless the chooser can demonstrate that 
ex ante he reasonably believed that his choice would not disserve on balance the interest of the 
relevant creatures in having such an opportunity.  More particularly, I want to point out the 
“radical” implications of liberalism to counter the frequently-made claim that moral arguments 
that focus on the existing commitments of the society or individuals to which they apply are 
conservative in that they support the status quo in the special sense of demanding no change in 
conduct: although that argument would be correct if all individuals and societies lived up to their 
moral commitments perfectly or (somewhat relatedly) if moral commitments had to be inferred 
from conduct and were isolated in the sense of not being interconnected, it will not be correct if 
either (1) moral commitments can be derived through foundationalist argument (see below) and 
are not always fulfilled or (2) moral commitments are derived from highly-qualified 
conventionalist argument (see below) that is designed to identify the moral norm that best 
discounted-fits the relevant empirical realities—a procedure that can yield determinant 
conclusions in the realistic case in which the relevant data does not perfectly fit the moral norm 
that it best discounted-fits. 
 In the other direction, I want to counter the contention of some readers that the corollary 
of liberalism just articulated would require us to return to a pre-industrial-revolution agricultural 
society (to abandon all or virtually all technology and revert to some imagined eighteenth-
century village life).  For two reasons, this contention is completely unjustified.  The first and 
less important is that it implicitly underestimates the dangerousness of even “pre-industrial-
revolution” agricultural labor and the toxicity of even pre-industrial fertilizer and agricultural 
run-offs.  The second and more important reason is that it ignores the fact that a great deal of 





nutrition, clothing, housing, medical care, and education that they need to live as long lives as 
they might under conditions that would give them an opportunity to take their lives morally 
seriously.  Certainly, a significant portion of contemporary Americans do not have the nutrition, 
clothing, housing, health care, formal education, range of experiences, and other sorts of 
opportunities with which I think our society’s liberal commitments entitle them to be supplied (if 
it is technologically and economically possible to do so).  I am optimistic that we could fulfill 
this basic obligation of a liberal, rights-based society by redistributing resources and 
opportunities to the poor and, most importantly, to the children of the poor—that our total 
product would suffice for this purpose even if it were reduced in the short and medium run (i.e., 
before the relevant redistributions increased the productivity of the children of the poor and their 
descendants) by the incentive-effects of the required redistribution.  However, I doubt that we 
could fulfill this obligation without engaging in industrial activities that would put at risk the 
opportunity of some to lead a life of moral integrity, perhaps regardless of the way in which they 
were carried out but certainly given the way in which they would be carried out despite the 
State’s efforts to prevent their wrongful execution.  It should be noted that this line of argument 
may legitimate not only economic activities that directly produce the goods and services that 
significantly contribute to individuals’ having a meaningful opportunity to lead a life of moral 
integrity but also economic activities that produce other goods and services whose availability 
provides the members of and participants in the society in question with an incentive to produce 
life-of-moral-integrity-related goods and services.  This point is made salient inter alia by the 
postulate of liberal idealism, which (in the version I will be referencing) asserts that when acting 
in non-political capacities the members of a liberal, rights-based society do not in general have 
an obligation to provide others with goods and services that their governments are obligated to 






                                                
1. The Morally-Legitimate, Internally-Correct Answer to Any Common-Law Legal-Rights 
Question in the United States 
 
 Part 1 argues that (with one possible exception3) the internally-correct answer to any legal 
issue that arises in a “common law of torts” case in the United States (the answer that is correct 
as a matter of American law) is the answer warranted by a liberal conception of corrective justice 
and explains in some detail the content of that conception of corrective justice.  The following 
argument explains the relationship between the morally-legitimate, internally-right answer to 
common-law torts-questions in the United States and the liberal conception of torts-related 
corrective-justice entitlements: 
(1) to be morally legitimate, the use of an argument to resolve a legal-rights question 
or the answer given to a legal-rights question must be consistent with the moral 
commitments of the society in which the legal analysis is being executed; 
 
(2) except to the extent that a contrary conclusion is warranted by the fact that the 
relevant society’s constitution contains text that is inconsistent with its moral 
commitments and whose import was properly understood by its ratifiers at the 
time of ratification, no argument whose use is inconsistent with the moral 
commitments of a society of moral integrity can ever be legally valid—i.e., can 
ever count in disputes about the internally-correct resolution of a legal-rights 
question in that society in a way that is inconsistent with that society’s moral 
commitments—and no answer to a legal-rights question that is inconsistent with 
such a society’s moral commitments can ever be internally correct; 
 
(3) the United States is a liberal, rights-based society of moral integrity; 
 
(4) neither the contemporary Constitution of the United States nor the constitution of 
any individual state contains text that is relevant to the resolution of any moral-




3 The possible exception relates to cases in which a liberal, rights-based State may be obligated to provide a 
legal entitlement to a victim who cannot establish that, more probably than not, any specific wrongdoer has been a 
but-for course of his loss to recover some or all of his loss from wrongdoers who may have wrongfully caused his 
loss and did wrongfully cause someone to suffer the type of loss he suffered.  This possibility is explored in the 
paper on the causation-element of corrective-justice claims to which I have already referred.  The issue has arisen in 
pharmaceutical cases in which the consumer cannot identify the specific company from which he bought a drug that 
caused him harm that materialized long after his purchase, in some asbestositis cases, in at least one case involving 
petroleum derivatives, and in a few hand-gun cases.  In some of these cases, courts have dealt with this issue by 
imposing market-share liability on each putative injurer.  For a clear presentation of the case-law, see DAN V. 





                                                
(5) the governments of rights-based societies are morally obligated to enforce the 
moral rights of those for whom they are responsible whenever they can do so 
without sacrificing the on-balance rights-related interests of those for whom they 
are responsible; 
 
(6) the governments of the United States need not sacrifice any rights-related interests 
to enforce the corrective-justice tort-related moral rights of those for whom they 
are responsible; therefore, 
 
(7) to the extent that the governments of the United States have chosen to fulfill their 
obligations to secure the corrective-justice rights of the society’s members and 
participants by creating common-law courts that are authorized to discover and 
legally enforce the corrective-justice-related moral rights of their society’s 
members and participants, those courts are obligated to base their conclusions in 
common-law cases (including common-law tort cases) in which the parties are 
asserting moral-rights-related legal rights on moral-rights arguments (on 
arguments of moral principle) and to reach conclusions in those cases that are 
consistent with the State’s obligation to secure the corrective-justice-related moral 
rights of the parties.4
 
A. The Moral Type, Moral Character, and Basic Moral-Rights Commitment of the United 
States 
 
 The preceding discussion clearly implies that the moral character, moral type, and moral 
commitments of the United States determine both (1) the set of arguments that can be 
legitimately and validly used to determine the content of the common law of torts in the United 
States and (2) the content of that law.  I will now delineate and explain the basis of my 
conclusions about these issues. 
 Societies can be placed into three, broad moral-character categories.  Some societies are 
amoral (have no moral commitments); some are immoral (are committed to effectuating some 
standard or achieving some goal whose effectuation or achievement is immoral—i.e., violates 
 
4 This conclusion is consistent with the conclusion that it would be morally legitimate (i.e., consistent with 
the relevant society’s moral commitments) for the legislature of a liberal, rights-based State to authorize courts that 
also have common-law jurisdiction to apply tort legislation it passed that did  not violate the corrective-justice-
related rights of any member of or participant in the society in question.  Part III will explore inter alia the moral 
legitimacy of the legislature of such a  State’s authorizing courts to enact such tort legislation on their own.  At this 
juncture, I will confine myself to the following observation: even if it would be consistent with such a society’s 
moral commitments for a legislature to authorize courts to enact legislation that would be applied only 
prospectively, it would clearly be morally impermissible for such a legislature to enact such legislation and apply it 





                                                
some ineliminable, universally-applicable tenet of morality); and some have moral integrity (are 
committed to a purported moral norm that is in fact moral and fulfill that commitment to some 
hard-to-specify, requisite extent).  In order to determine whether a particular society is amoral, is 
immoral, or has moral integrity, it is necessary (1) to identify the decision-standard(s) it purports 
to use or seems implicitly to use to resolve various issues, (2) to determine whether the identified 
decision-standards are moral, immoral, or non-moral, and (3) to assess the extent to which its 
members’ and governments’ conduct is consistent with the decision-standards they claim to be 
using or the decision-standards their discourse, perceptions, and conduct imply they are using. 
 Societies of moral integrity can themselves be divided into two types—rights-based 
societies and goal-based societies.5 The statement that a given culture is rights-based has two 
predicates.  First, members of a rights-based culture engage in two kinds of prescriptive-moral 
discourse—moral-ought discourse about what an individual or the State morally-ought to do and 
moral-rights discourse about what an individual or the State is morally obligated to do.  Second, 
in a rights-based culture, an individual cannot excuse or justicize (establish the justness of) a 
choice that violates someone’s moral rights by demonstrating that it was consistent with the 
personal ultimate values to which the individual subscribed, and the State cannot justicize a 
choice that violates someone’s moral rights by demonstrating that it helped the State achieve one 
or more goals the State is authorized to pursue. In other words, in a rights-based culture, moral-
rights claims are strongly distinguished from moral-ought claims, and moral-rights conclusions 
(and the moral norms on which they are based—hereinafter “moral principles”) trump (are 
lexically prior to) moral-ought conclusions and the moral norms from which they are derived 
(hereinafter “personal ultimate values”).  Of course, nothing in the preceding account of rights-
based cultures denies the reality that most individual and State choices in rights-based cultures 
do not implicate the moral rights of the non-chooser—that even in rights-based cultures, the only 
moral issue raised by most choices that have a moral dimension is what the relevant chooser 
morally-ought to do. 
 
 
5 Although some would argue that ideal-based societies should be distinguished from goal-based societies 
and rights-based societies, I would classify ideal-based societies as a subtype of goal-based societies.  Similarly, 
although some would claim that religious-duty-based societies should be classified separately from goal-based 





                                                                                                                                                            
 The statement that a society of moral integrity is goal-based implies that its members do 
not draw a strong distinction between moral-ought discourse and moral-rights discourse.  
Although members of a goal-based society may sometimes use moral-rights language, they do so 
simply to communicate the strength or certainty of their view about what they think morally-
ought to be done.  Correlatively, although goal-based societies may have a category 
“constitutional rights,” these rights are enforced only when doing so enables the State to achieve 
its preferred goals—i.e., in goal-based societies, goals trump what they (to my mind, 
misleadingly) call “rights” when the goals and “rights” favor different courses of conduct. 
 To determine whether a given society of moral integrity is goal-based or rights-based, 
one must observe its members’ prescriptive-moral conduct and discourse and determine 
(1) whether they draw a strong distinction between moral-rights claims and moral-
ought claims, 
 
(2) whether they conclude that, when the answer to something they may refer to as a 
“moral-rights claim” conflicts with the answer that the evaluator would give to the 
question “what morally-ought to de done,” the moral-rights conclusion trumps the 
moral-ought conclusion, and 
 
(3) whether (relatedly) any individual who (government that) violates what is 
sometimes called his (its) moral obligations because of his (its) sincere 
commitment to a particular personal ultimate value (to achieving some goal) is 
subjected to weighty moral censure on that account. 
 
 I assume that there is no single, objectively-true, universally-applicable moral norm on 
which rights-based societies of moral integrity must be committed to grounding their moral-
rights-related conduct (or, for that matter, to which goal-based societies of moral integrity must 
be exclusively committed).  Since I believe that an appropriate “empirical” analysis6 would 
 
 
members, like those of rights-based societies, strongly distinguish the right from the good and lexically order the 
right over the good. 
6 As the text implies, my approach to determining the moral commitments of a given society is “highly-
qualified” conventionalist.  I enquoted the word “empirical” because the highly-qualified conventionalist approach I 
deem appropriate incorporates particular views about the nature and domain of moral norms—e.g., (1) that certain 
purported decision-standards do not qualify as “moral norms” (i.e., that a decision-standard must have certain 
attributes or cannot have other attributes if it is to qualify as a moral norm), (2) that a society of moral integrity must 
have consistent commitments across its various domains of decisionmaking, etc.  I want to indicate that, although I 
have never been convinced by any purely-conceptual argument for the “objective truth” of a particular norm of 
justice, I do not reject the possibility that some such foundationalist argument could succeed.  For an account of the 





                                                                                                                                                            
reveal that the United  States is a rights-based society of moral integrity, I will focus on the 
protocol one should follow to identify the moral principle or moral-principle combination to 
which a rights-based society is committed. 
 I think that two criteria must be used to evaluate the various possible candidates for a 
given rights-based society’s “basic moral principle” title.  The first relevant criterion is how 
closely the post-dictions and predictions of various “candidates” for the “basic moral principle” 
title fit the following facts: (A) the prescriptive-moral conduct of the members of the society and 
their governments, (B) the moral-rights claims that its members, participants, and governments 
made and did not make, (C) the arguments that were made and not made in support of the claims 
in question both by the disputants and by those who evaluated their claims, (D) the conclusions 
that were reached about the claims in question, (E) how close the “cases” in question were 
perceived to be, and (F) how certain members of the relevant society were about the proper 
resolution of the claims in question.  The second relevant criterion is the extent to which the non-
fits associated with each principle-candidate are explicable in terms that reduce the damage the 
non-fits do to its candidacy—viz., the extent to which the non-fits can be explained by (A) the 
greater power of the non-fits’ beneficiaries, (B) the presence of mechanical transaction costs or 
other types of costs that made it unattractive for parties to pursue justified claims or attractive for 
parties to pursue unjustified claims, (C) the fact that the relevant individuals did not adequately 
consider the arguments they made, the conclusions they reached, or the conduct in which they 
engaged, (D) conceptual intellectual errors that the relevant actors might very well have 
committed, and/or (E) other sorts of errors that may have been committed by moral-right holders 
or obligors or have been or might be committed by deciders of moral-rights disputes or moral-
rights-related legal-rights disputes.  In brief, in my view, the basic moral principle of a rights-
based society is the moral norm that best discounted-fits its members’ and governments’ relevant 
conduct, discourse, and perceptions where the non-fits associated with each “candidate” are 
discounted by their discount-justifying explicability. 
 
and the various types of conventionalist approaches that have been used to determine whether a given society is 
moral, immoral, or amoral, to determine whether a given society of moral integrity is rights-based or goal-based, and 
to identify the particular moral norm that a society of moral integrity is committed to instantiating, see Richard S. 





                                                
 I believe that the application of these criteria to the results of an acceptably-thorough 
analysis of the prescriptive-moral discourse, perceptions, and conduct of members of our culture 
would lead to the conclusion that ours is a liberal, rights-based society of moral integrity.  More 
specifically, such an investigation would yield the conclusion that ours is a rights-based culture 
whose members and government(s) are obligated to show appropriate, equal respect and concern 
for all moral-rights holders for whom they are or it is responsible.  The liberal duty of 
appropriate, equal concern covers concern both (1) for the “welfare” of other members of the 
society in the sense in which economists conceptualize “welfare” (see below) but pre-eminently 
(2) for these creatures’ having the opportunity to actualize their potential to become and remain 
persons of moral integrity by taking their obligations seriously and striving to establish a 
reflective equilibrium between their personal value-convictions and their conduct.  This 
conclusion reflects the fact that liberalism values lives of moral integrity more highly than 
anything else.  Although the required “empirical investigation” would take into account official 
acts by government employees, political acts by private members of our culture when performing 
political roles, and the conduct of various participants in adjudicatory proceedings, it would 
primarily focus on the prescriptive-moral discourse, perceptions, and conduct of members of our 
culture outside of governmental fora or electoral processes. 
 
B. The Tort-Related Corrective-Justice-Related Obligations of the Members and 
Governments of a Liberal, Rights-Based State 
 
 This section analyzes the implications of a liberal, rights-based society’s generic 
commitment to showing appropriate, equal respect and concern for all moral-rights holders for 
whom it is responsible for (1) the tort-related moral obligations and rights of its members and 
participants and (2) the obligations of its governments to secure the tort-related moral-rights-
related interests of those for whom it is responsible.  I want to reiterate that these issues are not 
the types of issues with which many legal philosophers who have focused on the law of torts 
have been concerned.  Admittedly, a few philosophical analyses of tort law have tried to analyze 
the implications of a particular value (say, libertarianism7) for the content of tort law in a State 
that is committed to that value (without ever establishing that any particular society is committed 
 





                                                
to the value in question).  However, most tort-law-focused philosophical analyses are not “top-
down”8 in the sense of starting with the value rather than with the law.  In particular, most tort-
law-focused philosophical analyses start with the law and try to devise the “best” philosophical 
(i.e., most-morally-attractive) account that can be given of our actual tort-law practice.  This 
orientation may well reflect the relevant authors’ subscription to the positivist position that legal 
practice is self-validating and perhaps self-legitimating.  Although I agree that a society’s legal 
practice constitutes part of the universe of prescriptive-moral conduct, perceptions, and discourse 
on which conclusions about a society’s moral character and commitments must be based, I 
believe that legal practice constitutes only a small percentage of the relevant data and that 
individual elements of and sometimes broad subsets of a society’s legal practice may be 
inconsistent with its moral commitments and, therefore, internally incorrect.  In any event, that is 
why my philosophical analysis of tort law starts with our society’s moral commitments 
(examines the implications for the common law of torts of my conclusion about our society’s 
moral commitments) rather than with our society’s tort law (rather than trying to develop the 
“best” philosophical account of our common-law-of-torts practice). 
 I also want to emphasize at the outset that—although the suggestions that follow are more 
than casual ruminations—I recognize that several are contestable and may well be wrong.  I am 
particularly concerned about the third, “self-conception-related” corollary of liberalism, which 
asserts that liberalism is specially concerned not only with losses that preclude people from 
leading lives of moral integrity but also with losses that militate against their leading such lives 
by affecting their self-conceptions in ways that make it less likely that they will take their moral 
agency and hence their moral lives seriously.  More specifically, my concern about this 
suggestion is less that it may be false but more that the specific types of losses and constraints 
that undermine our self-respect in the relevant way may vary from society to society and from 
group to group or individual to individual within a given society and that the resulting 
“squishiness” of this category of losses may undermine the practicability of the liberal approach 
to tort law as a whole. 
 For somewhat different reasons, I am also troubled by the “non-uniqueness” qualification 
to the basic liberal duty to rescue that I suggest liberalism may warrant.  At least in part, I have 
 





been led to propose this qualification to render compatible with liberalism some of our legal 
system’s failure to recognize duties to rescue that one would otherwise conclude liberalism 
would impose.  Although I do think that my discussion of this qualification is relevant and worth 
considering, I cannot say that I find it thoroughly convincing. 
 In any event, even if in the end you conclude that one or more of what I claim are tort-
related corollaries of liberalism cannot be said to be so, I hope that my discussion of them will 
make a contribution by stimulating constructive criticism and the articulation of superior 
alternatives.  If the tone of the rest of Part I is confident, the author is not. 
 
(1) The Tort-Related Obligations of the Members of a Liberal, Rights-Based Society 
 
 My tentative view is that the concrete tort-duty implications of the generic liberal duty of 
appropriate, equal respect and concern is captured by seven corollaries of liberalism or related 
sets of such corollaries.  Before discussing these corollaries, I want to point out a presupposition 
of the first five that economists will find uncongenial—viz., that, from the relevant, liberal 
perspective, not all benefits and harms are commensurable.  Economists (or perhaps I should say 
the overwhelming majority of economists who believe that it is always desirable to make the 
choice that maximizes “welfare” in the sense of maximizing utility, pleasure, satisfaction, or the 
kind of “well-being” that is connected with such concepts and the minority of economists who 
admit that at least some members of our society are committed to a coherent value that implies 
that the desirability of a choice depends in whole or in part on its impact on the distribution of 
such “welfare”) implicitly assume that all effects of any choice are commensurable.  More 
specifically, in their view, all effects of any choice can be measured in units of utility or pleasure.  
I doubt that the assumption of commensurability would be justified even if all evaluations should 
focus exclusively on the kind of well-being with which most economists seem to be exclusively 
concerned.  In particular, I doubt that a single metric can be used to measure such varied psychic 
experiences as pleasure, satisfaction, ecstasy, unease, unhappiness, terror, etc.  However, even if 
all effects of a choice were commensurable from the perspective of any value that focuses 
exclusively on such well-being, various effects of choices would not be commensurable from the 






                                                
 Thus, as the first corollary of liberalism I will discuss asserts, from a liberal perspective, 
any pleasure or satisfaction that an actor obtains by inflicting otherwise-unjusticized pain on, 
degrading, or controlling another does not count the same for a liberal as the other sorts of 
pleasures that a choice can confer on the actor.  And as all the remaining corollaries of liberalism 
I will delineate manifest, from a liberal perspective, the conventional pleasures that a choice 
yields are not commensurable with the loss an individual sustains when a private or 
governmental choice deprives him of the opportunity to lead a life of moral integrity by killing 
him, depriving him of the neurological prerequisites for acting as a moral agent, or perhaps 
subjecting him to life-dominating pain or when a private or governmental choice strongly 
militates against his seizing the opportunity to lead a life of moral integrity by inflicting losses on 
him that in the circumstances in question cause him to doubt his authorship of his own life and 
hence to question his moral responsibility for his actions. 
 Because the point of the preceding paragraph is critical, I want to restate it somewhat 
differently.  Economists who are concerned exclusively with the maximization or distribution of 
welfare or utility as they understand those concepts value protecting moral-rights holders’ lives, 
neurological prerequisites for leading a life of moral integrity, privacy, and psychological 
capacity to lead a life of moral integrity to the extent that the relevant protections increase the 
utility of their direct beneficiaries and any others they affect.  Liberalism values the promotion of 
lives of moral integrity not primarily because the promotion of such lives increases utility but 
because it values such lives in themselves.  Indeed, liberalism considers promoting lives of moral 
integrity to be a higher-order value than increasing mere utility.  In the current context, this 
conclusion is salient because it implies that the fact that a choice maximizes utility as economists 
understand this concept cannot justicize it if it deprives people of the opportunity to lead a life of 
moral integrity or militates against moral-rights holders’ seizing this opportunity by undermining 
their sense of being the authors of their own lives.9  The second through seventh corollaries of 
liberalism I will discuss all reflect this fact. 
 
 
9 Another corollary of the fact that liberals value the opportunity to lead a life of moral integrity in itself is 
that liberals would not base their assessment of the value of this opportunity or of the privacy and self-ownership 
whose protection fosters people’s taking their lives morally seriously by the value that the beneficiaries of such 
protection and opportunities would place on them if they were maximizers and were perfectly informed about the 





                                                                                                                                                            
 In any event, I suspect that most economists will reject the various corollaries of 
liberalism I will delineate because they will reject the incommensurability premises they 
manifest.  If experience is any guide, many economists will attempt to justify their rejection of 
these corollaries by arguing that the liberal value that supposedly underlies them is incoherent in 
the sense of having no substantive content.  In so doing, they will be repeating their standard 
mistake of assuming that the fact that the extensions of some concept are contestable or cannot 
be derived mechanically from its linguistic definition implies that the concept has no denotation. 
 I hasten to point out, however, that various philosophically-inclined lawyers who have 
taken an interest in corrective justice and at least some judges share my perception that our 
society regards at least some of the harms and benefits that wrongdoing can generate to be 
incommensurate.  For example, Hanoch Dagan has noted with approval the fact that the measure 
of recovery that is available in “unjust enrichment” suits—compensation for harm suffered, “fair 
market value” of the resource taken, or profits realized by the wrongdoer—depends on whether 
in the society in question the resources taken “are viewed merely as valuable assets that have no 
direct bearing on the identity of their holder” or are “attached to [their] holder’s identity”—i.e., 
on whether the resources taken are “fungible” or “constitutive.”10
 
(A) The First, Illicit-Satisfaction Corollary of Liberalism 
 
 The first of the seven corollaries of liberalism that I think are relevant to the analysis of 
the tort-related corrective-justice-related rights of the members of and participants in a liberal, 
rights-based State is that such individuals cannot justicize imposing a tort-type loss on someone 
else by citing the satisfaction or equivalent-dollar gain they obtain from inflicting otherwise-
unjusticized pain on the other, from degrading the other, and/or from controlling the other.  To 
the contrary, rather than counting for the justness of the conduct in question, the fact that it yields 
satisfaction for these sorts of reasons counts against its “moral permissibility” (i.e., in my usage, 
 
ours is a liberal, rights-based society reflects my belief that most members of our culture value leading a life of 
moral integrity in the way that liberalism does, the fact that some members of our society do not would not affect the 
liberal evaluation of choices that alter the opportunities people have to lead such lives and/or the likelihood that they 
will take advantage of these opportunities (as it would the utilitarian or allocative-efficiency-oriented evaluation of 
such choices). 
10 See Hanoch Dagan, The Distributive Foundation of Corrective Justice, 98 MICH. L. REV. 138 at 140, 142, 





                                                
counts against its consistency with such a society’s moral-rights commitments)—indeed, may 
actually guarantee its moral impermissibility (say, when these types of satisfaction critically 
affected the chooser’s decision to make the choice in question).  This first, tort-related corollary 
of liberalism is most relevant to such torts as invasions of privacy, assault, battery, false 
imprisonment, and intentional infliction of emotional distress. 
 
(B) The Second, “Opportunity to Lead a Life of Moral Integrity”-Related Corollary of 
Liberalism 
 
 The second corollary of liberalism that relates to the tort obligations of members of a 
liberal, rights-based society applies to the assessment of avoidance-move rejections that may 
deprive their victims of the opportunity to lead lives of moral integrity—say, by killing them, by 
depriving them of the neurological prerequisites for leading a life of moral integrity, or  (perhaps, 
if this concept is not disqualifyingly “squishy”) by causing them to experience pain that 
dominates their lives sufficiently to prevent them from considering their obligations, devising 
their personal conception of the good, and striving to lead a life that is consonant with this 
conception.  According to this corollary, a moral agent who is a potential injurer who knows or 
ought to have known that his choice might impose a life-of-moral-integrity-precluding loss on 
another extant rights-bearer will be able to justicize his choice if and only if, after doing 
appropriate research, he concluded that ex ante his choice should not be predicted to disserve the 
on-balance, weighted-average “having the opportunity to lead a life of moral integrity”-related 
interests of those for whom he was responsible.11
 Thus, the second tort-related corollary of liberalism implies that a pharmaceutical 
manufacturer whose production would put toxins in the air that will cause some to die or to 
 
 
11 I do not think that a potential injurer can render legitimate a choice that violates this corollary of liberalism 
by securing his potential victims’ consent to the choice in question by paying them for this consent.  Liberalism 
cannot countenance ex ante consent to the type of choice in question (at least if the society has fulfilled its obligation 
to provide each rights-bearer for whom it is responsible with the material wherewithal for leading a life of moral 
integrity so that the consent would not serve the consenter’s or his beneficiaries’ interests in having the opportunity 
to lead lives of moral integrity by providing them with material prerequisites for leading such lives that they 
otherwise would have lacked).  Nor do I think that the government of a liberal, rights-based State can discharge the 
obligations it has in relation to this corollary of liberalism by insuring that all victims of its violation receive 
compensation from the violator who harmed them.  Since, from a liberal perspective, this harm is not compensable, 





                                                                                                                                                            
experience chronic pain that disables them from leading a life of moral integrity would be able to 
justicize his production-decision only if, after doing appropriate research, he reasonably 
concluded that the weighted-average-expected number of days of lives of moral integrity that his 
output (or the last units of his output) would give people the opportunity to lead by helping them 
survive or easing their pain was not smaller than the weighted-average-expected number of days 
of lives of moral integrity he should expect the pollution it would generate to deprive people of 
the opportunity to lead by killing moral-rights holders, depriving them of the neurological 
prerequisites for leading a life of moral integrity, or subjecting them to life-dominating pain.. 
 Five sets of points need to be made about this corollary of liberalism.  The first two are 
equally applicable to the third corollary of liberalism.  I am uncertain about two features of the 
“opportunity to lead a life of moral integrity”-oriented obligation that liberal, rights-based 
societies are committed to instantiating.  Thus, I am uncertain about whether the second and third 
corollaries should assert that the relevant choosers are obligated to base their avoidance-decision 
on the prediction they should make of its net impact on (1) the number of days of lives of moral 
integrity that relevant individuals are prevented from having the opportunity to lead by death, 
neurological disability, or chronic pain or (2) the number of extant persons who are prevented by 
death, neurological disability, or pain from leading lives of moral integrity (though, as the 
preceding paragraph suggests, I am inclined to think that the former metric is the appropriate 
standard).  Somewhat relatedly, I am also uncertain about whether the second and third 
corollaries of liberalism should deem relevant any tendency of an avoidance-move rejection to 
affect the number of individuals with the neurological prerequisites to lead lives of moral 
integrity that are born (though I am inclined to think it should not).12
 Second, the second corollary of liberalism (and the third) will at least sometimes imply 
the fault and hence liability of an injurer who would not be deemed “negligent” in the sense in 
which that concept is operationalized through the variant of the Hand formula that would be 
 
violations of this corollary that would not preclude it from securing weightier rights-based interests by reducing the 
society’s other types of economic output. 
12 See John Broome, Cost-Benefit Analysis and Population in Cost-Benefit Analysis: Legal, Economic, and 
Philosophical Perspectives (Matthew Adler and Eric Posner, eds.) 117 (2002).  For some comments on Broome’s 
analysis of this issue, see Richard S. Markovits, Book Review, ___ ETHICS ___ (2004)—a review of COST-BENEFIT 






                                                
appropriate to use to assess the wrongfulness of conduct that might generate mere-utility losses 
but could not generate life-of-moral-integrity-related losses in ways other than by reducing the 
victims’ material resources below the level they must have to be in a position to take the moral 
dimension of their lives seriously.  In part, this conclusion reflects the fact that the calculation on 
which the second corollary bases its fault conclusion ignores the rejection-decision’s impact on 
things other than the number of days of moral integrity that relevant individuals have the 
opportunity to lead.  However, even if this were not the case, the outcome of a Hand calculation 
might not be the same as the outcome of the second corollary’s calculation because (as I have 
already indicated), unlike the Hand formula, the second corollary does not value the “costs” and 
“benefits” on which it focuses by the equivalent-dollar value that those who experience these 
effects place on them (or even by the equivalent-dollar value they would place on them, given 
their conception of the good, if they were otherwise perfectly informed). 
 Third, I want to point out that this second corollary can be, has been, and perhaps should 
be articulated in a way that is consistent with the postulate of liberal dualism, which 
distinguishes the obligations of the participants in a liberal, rights-based State when acting in 
their private capacities and the obligations of such a State itself and correlatively of its members 
when performing political roles.  More specifically, the variant of the postulate of liberal dualism 
that I use in the current context asserts that—because the private conduct of the individual 
participants in a liberal, rights-based society did not, in general, cause or make them morally 
responsible for the extant variations in their co-participants’ income/wealth positions13 or in 
various attributes of  these individuals themselves that affect their abilities to take advantage of 
any opportunity they have to lead a life of moral integrity—the private duties of the individual 
participants in a liberal, rights-based society do not (in general) depend on the leading-a-life-of-
moral-integrity-related consequences of their choices that reflect the fact that the income/wealth 
positions of those the relevant choices affect deviate from the society-average or the fact that 
those the relevant choices affect have other non-average characteristics that influence their 
ability to seize an opportunity to lead a life of moral integrity.  Hence, although when acting in 
 
13 In a society in which materialism plays a significant role, not only the absolute income/wealth position of 
an individual but also his relative income/wealth position may affect his ability to take advantage of an opportunity 





political capacities, participants in a liberal, rights-based State are morally obligated to ensure 
that those for whom their society is responsible have the money, more specific kinds of 
resources, experiences, and opportunities that critically affect their ability to take their lives 
morally seriously, the private-law duties of such individuals do not in general reflect such 
considerations—i.e., require only that such individuals do not make choices that disserve the 
interest of relevant individuals in having the opportunity to lead lives of moral integrity by 
killing them directly, depriving them of the neurological prerequisites for leading such lives, or 
subjecting them to life-dominating pain (do not require that potential injurers take account of the 
possibility that the loss an avoidance-move they have rejected might have prevented would have 
militated against its victims’ taking their lives morally seriously by depriving them of the 
nutrition, housing, medical care, education, or other experiences that are prerequisites of their 
making meaningful moral choices). 
 Fourth, I want to concretize this second postulate and use the examples in question to 
respond to the objection I mentioned in the Introduction that it would require us to revert to a 
pre-industrial-revolution economy.  I will use three examples for this purpose. 
 The first focuses on the decision of a pharmaceutical manufacturer to produce additional 
units of a product that would prolong the life or critically reduce the pain of its consumers in the 
face of the fact that—even if carefully executed—the production of these drugs would generate 
pollution that shortened the lives of victims who inhaled or ingested it, would deprive them of 
the neurological capacity to lead lives of moral integrity, or would subject them to life-
dominating pain.  The second corollary implies that such a company’s production of the relevant 
units of its product would have been wrongful unless 
(1) after doing appropriate research (see the fifth set of corollaries), it reasonably 
concluded that no alternative method of producing its last units of output or all its 
output would have been ranked higher under an opportunity-to-lead-a-life-of-
moral-integrity metric (see below); 
 
(2) after doing appropriate research, it reasonably concluded that its last units of 
production and its overall output would not disserve the on-balance interest of the 
society’s members and participants in having and taking advantage of the 
opportunity to lead lives of moral integrity because its decision to produce these 
units would promote that interest more by helping its customers recover from 
injury or illness, by easing their pain, and/or by inducing others to supply goods 





participants to lead lives of moral integrity than it would disserve the relevant 
interests of these individuals by exposing its victims to the toxins it put in the air; 
and perhaps 
 
(3) although it did not do appropriate research and/or did not properly consider the 
information at its disposal, those failures did not cause it to make a choice that 
disserved the relevant on-balance interests of the society’s members and 
participants. 
 
 Some explanation is required.  As I indicated in the Introduction, an act or activity that 
does not increase someone’s opportunity to lead a life of moral integrity “directly” by prolonging 
his life, preserving his relevant neurological capacities, or relieving him of life-dominating pain 
may do so “indirectly” by providing him with needed nutrition, clothing, housing, medical care, 
or education.  Acts or activities can perform this latter function either by supplying such goods 
and services themselves or by providing goods and services whose availability provides others 
with the incentive to provide such services.  Although relevantly-dangerous choices by 
pharmaceutical companies may be particularly likely to be rendered non-wrongful by their direct 
tendency to increase the opportunity that some relevant individuals have to lead a life of moral 
integrity, the choices of such companies may also generate this type of benefit indirectly by 
providing others with an incentive to produce needed goods or services. 
 The second example focuses on the decision of a manufacturer of some product to 
transport the goods it produces in a way that, in comparison with the situation that would prevail 
if it did not produce these goods, creates a risk that individuals who are potential victims of 
vehicular accidents in which its transport vehicles will be involved or of the pollution those 
vehicles will generate will on those accounts lose the opportunity to lead a life of moral integrity.  
The second corollary implies that such a company’s decision to transport its output in the way in 
question will be wrongful unless it can demonstrate that, at least as probably as not, one or both 
of the following two propositions are true: 
(1) after doing appropriate research, it reasonably concluded that a switch to any 
alternative method of transportation that would have served the interest of 
relevant individuals in having the opportunity to lead a life of moral integrity by 
reducing the relevant types of accident or pollution losses would not have served 
those interests on balance because—by increasing the company’s marginal 
costs—it would have induced it to reduce its output in circumstances in which the 





would have promoted the goal of increasing the opportunity relevant individuals 
have to lead a life of moral integrity on balance or 
 
(2) although it did not do appropriate research and/or failed to process the 
information at its disposal appropriately, these failures did not cause it to make a 
choice that disserved the relevant on-balance interest of relevant individuals. 
 
In this more general case, it is less likely that any reduction in the number of units produced 
would deprive individuals of an opportunity to lead a life of moral integrity directly and 
therefore more likely that it would have to do so indirectly by reducing the incentives of others to 
produce needed nutrition, clothing, housing, medical care, and education for the use of the more 
dangerous method of transport to be non-wrongful. 
 The third example focuses on a decision by a private actor to take a pleasure-drive in a 
car that he reasonably believed to be appropriately safe that he would operate appropriately 
carefully.  Since even when driven carefully a car whose driver reasonably and perhaps correctly 
believed to be safe may be involved in an accident that will deprive someone of the opportunity 
to lead a life of moral integrity and may generate pollution that has this effect—indeed, may 
have such consequences for others whose losses cannot be partly attributed to wrongful choices 
that they made, does this second tort-related corollary of liberalism imply the wrongfulness of 
such pleasure-drives?  Since I recognize that this implication would not fit our societal practice, I 
would like to be able to provide reasons why this corollary might not deem such pleasure-driving 
wrongful. 
 I can think of at least three such reasons.  First, virtually all activities create such risks.  
An enormous number of opportunity-to-lead-a-life-of-moral-integrity-depriving accidents occur 
around the home.  Careful pleasure-driving may not create significantly more dangers of this 
kind than the other activities people would substitute for it. 
 Second, the option of taking careful pleasure-drives may motivate some people to supply 
more or more valuable market labor and the increase in their market product that results may 
increase the opportunity that others have to lead a life of moral integrity either directly (because 
the extra goods produced are goods whose supply to them critically affects their opportunity to 
lead such a life) or indirectly (because the availability of this extra output induces others to 





                                                
have the material, formal-educational, and experiential prerequisites for leading a life of moral 
integrity).14
 The third reason why the second tort-related corollary of liberalism may not imply the 
wrongfulness of pleasure-driving is connected to the third tort-related corollary of liberalism I 
will delineate.  Like this third corollary, it derives from a belief that people will not seize the 
opportunity to lead a life of moral integrity unless they consider themselves to be morally 
responsible for their own choices and that private actions and legal rules that strongly limit their 
options will militate against their doing so by preventing them from concluding that they are the 
authors of their own lives.  In the current context, this concern creates the possibility that any 
conclusion that pleasure-driving of the type described is wrongful would on balance disserve the 
goal of promoting lives of moral integrity by deterring people from seizing the opportunity to 
lead such lives by altering their self-conceptions in a way that makes it less likely that they will 
take their lives morally seriously. 
 The fifth and final set of points I want to make about the second tort-related corollary of 
liberalism concerns its relationship to various other proposals for holding liable injurers whose 
rejection-choices would not be deemed to violate a Hand-type test that was universally applied to 
all harm-inflicting choices (including, for example, activity-level choices and choices to enter or 
stay in business).  In particular, various judges and scholars have argued for the internal-to-law 
correctness and/or (moral) legitimacy15 of imposing strict liability on one or more of the 
 
 
14 The preceding discussions of transport choice focused on the implications of liberalism for the “transport-
related” obligations of commercial concerns and possible pleasure-drivers.  The second tort-related corollary of 
liberalism also has implications for the transport obligations of the governments of a liberal, rights-based State.  
Unless these governments could not supply the relevant public transport without reducing other expenditures that 
would promote the opportunity to lead a life of moral integrity to a greater extent, they would be obligated to supply 
such transport facilities or to induce private parties to do so if such transport would be safer in the relevant respects 
than purely private transport.  Of course, this conclusion would be relevant to the pleasure-driving case only if the 
pleasure-driver did not value the driving in itself but wanted to drive to get to a location in which he could engage in 
a desired leisure activity.  I should add that I can also imagine circumstances in which the governments of a liberal, 
rights-based State would be obligated to try to educate their society’s members and participants not to have 
preferences whose satisfaction would create dangers that would be of particular concern to liberals. 
15 The textual distinction between the “internal-to-law correctness” and “moral legitimacy” of a legal 
conclusion assumes that valid legal argument (argument that is supposed to be relevant to the resolution of questions 
about the substantive content of existing law in the society in question) can generate internally-right answers to at 
least some extant-legal-rights questions in that society that are morally illegitimate.  An answer to a legal-rights 
question is internal-to-law correct (correct as a matter of law) if it is the unique answer generated by valid legal 
argument in the society in question.  An answer to such a question is (morally) legitimate if it is consistent with the 





                                                                                                                                                            
following possibly-partially-overlapping sets of injurers whose avoidance-move rejections were 
not allocatively inefficient (whose avoidance-choices would not be deemed negligent if an 
appropriately-revised Hand formula were used to assess their negligence): 
(1) all injurers who cause any type of harm covered by tort-law;16
 
(2) injurers engaged in an “abnormally dangerous” activity even if (A) the activity 
were carried out with due care and (B) the chooser’s location-choice and activity-
level choice were not allocatively inefficient if its “value” to the “community” 
was outweighed by the danger it posed;17
 
 
internal-to-law correct legal conclusion may be morally illegitimate if it is based on a textual argument that focuses 
on a morally-illegitimate provision of the relevant society’s constitution.  Of course, if this provision is sufficiently 
important, the relevant society’s failure to pass a constitutional amendment that eliminates it will call the society’s 
moral integrity into question. 
16 See Epstein, op. cit. supra note 7. 
17 This proposal  is derived from §§519-20 of the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS and (possibly) from the 
case-law on so-called “ultrahazardous activities” that the RESTATEMENT purports to summarize.  More specifically, 
this proposal amounts to an allocative-efficiency-oriented interpretation of some language in these sections that 
might be read to imply that the case-law holds activities to be strictly liable as ultrahazardous only if—in addition to 
meeting the other criteria for this classification—their location and/or intensity is allocatively inefficient—an 
interpretation under which an activity’s location is deemed “inappropriate” if and only if it is allocatively inefficient 
and an activity’s “value to the community” is deemed to be “outweighed by its dangerous attributes” only if the 
activity altogether or the activity-level that prevailed is allocatively inefficient.  If this condition must be fulfilled for 
an activity to be an ultrahazardous activity and hence subject to strict liability, the doctrine would impose strict 
liability only on injurers whose choices were negligent in the sense in which economists assume the Hand formula 
defines negligence (but would not be assessed for negligence under our current practice).  The doctrine has clearly 
been invoked in some cases in which there was no evidence that the injurer had made an allocatively-inefficient 
activity-level or location choice—e.g., in cases involving fires caused by trucks delivering gasoline to urban gas 
stations.  Before proceeding, I should emphasize that I do not think that this allocative-efficiency-oriented 
interpretation of these sections of the RESTATEMENT is correct.  As the next paragraph of the text suggests, I believe 
that the key terms in these sections should be interpreted in the way that would make the legal position they 
articulate identical to my second, life-of-moral-integrity-related liberal postulate. 
 In any event, two further points should be made about the RESTATEMENT’s list of determinants of the 
ultrahazardous status of an activity.  First, the RESTATEMENT lists as separate determinants of ultrahazardousness 
whether the activity creates a high probability of loss and whether the activity creates a probability of a high loss.  
The reason why the relevant determinant is not the size of the weighted-average-expected loss is obscure.  Second, it 
is also not clear why the uncommonness of an activity is relevant to its ultrahazardous status or the appropriateness 
of imposing strict liability on those who engage in it.  Perhaps the RESTATEMENT’s drafters and ratifiers thought that 
the likelihood that an activity’s victims could engage in most-allocatively-efficient avoidance is inversely related to 
its uncommonness.  If so, I am skeptical of this empirical generalization.  For a case in which the uncommonness of 
the defendant’s activity seems to have played a role, see Spano v. Perini Corp., 25 N.Y.2d 11, 250 N.E.2d 31 (1969) 
(blasting). 
 One final point may be worth making.  The proposal that this note discusses is related to a slightly-different 
proposal by Landes and Posner that industries be held strictly liable in their infancy but liable only when found 
negligent in relation to precautions taken when mature.  See William Landes and Richard Posner, The Positive 
Economic Theory of Tort-Law, 15 GA. L. REV. 851 (1981).  I have not listed this proposal in the text because Landes 
and Posner believe that it can be justified by its allocative efficiency (though, admittedly, this claim is different from 
the claim that it could be justicized as an approach to holding liable injurers who more probably than not were 
negligent).  For an explanation of why this proposal cannot be justified in allocative-efficiency terms and a critique 





                                                                                                                                                            
 
(3) injurers who made a choice that (A) caused a kind of loss covered by tort law in a 
way covered by tort law and (B) unilaterally imposed on another a risk of a 
substantial loss of a type covered by tort law;18
 
(4) injurers who made a harmful choice that (A) imposed a unilateral risk on its 
potential victims and (B) imposed an actual tort-law-covered loss of any 
magnitude on a victim;19
 
(5) injurers who made a harmful choice that (A) imposed a unilateral risk on a victim 
who (B) could not increase allocative efficiency by avoiding the loss he 
suffered;20 and 
 
(6) injurers who (A) made a choice that imposed a unilateral risk on its victim, (B) 
had the capacity to foresee that their choice might harm someone else, and (C) 
had the ability and opportunity to prevent the harm that resulted.21
 
 With one possible exception, the second tort-related corollary of liberalism differs from 
all these proposals in two respects.  First, unlike these alternative proposals, it applies only when 
the loss in question deprives the victim of the opportunity to lead a life of moral integrity in ways 
other than by reducing his material resources below the level needed to make his formal 
opportunity to lead a life of moral integrity valuable.22  Second, unlike these alternatives, it 
recognizes that injurers who have imposed the kind of loss on some victims that triggers its 
 
 
Shifting From a “Negligence” System to a “Strict-Liability” Regime in Our Highly-Pareto-Imperfect Economy: A 
Partial and Preliminary Third-Best-Allocative-Efficiency Analysis, 73 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 11, 123-32 (1998). 
18 See Bolton v. Stone, A.C. 850 (H.L.) (1951). 
19 George Fletcher, Fairness and Utility in Tort Theory, 85 HARV. L. REV. 537 (1972). 
20 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §520 A contains an example of a falling airplane that seems to be 
designed to reveal the salience of the victim’s inability to engage in allocatively-efficient avoidance. 
21 See Stephen Perry Responsibility for Outcomes, Risk, and the Law of Torts in PHILOSOPHY AND THE LAW 
OF TORTS (Gerald Postema, ed.) 72 (2001). 
22 Even those proposals that cover choices that have imposed substantial losses are different from the second 
tort-related corollary of liberalism in this regard because 
(1) many substantial losses do not directly deprive their victims of life or the ability to take their lives 
morally seriously by diminishing their neurological capacities or subjecting them to dominating 
pain, 
(2) although some substantial reductions in the kind of welfare on which economists tend to focus 
may so overwhelm the victim as to prevent him from thinking of anything else, most will not, 
(3) most substantial reductions in material welfare will not lower any of their victims’ positions to a 
level that requires them to concentrate all their efforts on surviving and securing minimal comfort 
or deprive them of the education or other types of experiences that may critically affect their 





                                                                                                                                                            
applicability can still exonerate themselves and escape liability by demonstrating that they 
should not have expected their choice to decrease on balance the extent to which the relevant 
population has the opportunity to lead lives of moral integrity.23  The possible exception is the 
 
 
(4) liberal dualism implies that injurers whose choices have deprived their victims of the opportunity 
to lead a life of moral integrity by reducing their material welfare below some minimal level are 
not morally responsible for this outcome. 
23 Some comments on the persuasiveness of these strict-liability proposals may be in order.  Supporters of the 
first proposal have claimed that it is required by libertarian values—that just as each individual’s self-ownership 
implies his entitlement (inter alia) to the fruits of his own labor, it implies his obligation to compensate those whom 
he has harmed.  At least two objections to this position are worth noting.  First, its proponents have failed to supply 
either a foundationalist argument establishing the universal, objective truth of libertarian values or a conventionalist 
argument establishing that our society is committed to libertarian values.  Second, as Stephen Perry has pointed out, 
this libertarian argument does not respond satisfactorily to the reality that tort losses are “scientifically caused” by 
the victim as much as by the injurer.  See Stephen Perry, The Impossibility of a General Strict Liability, 1 
CANADIAN J. OF LAW AND JUR. 197, 161-66 (1988) and op. cit. supra note 21 at 85-86.  More specifically, 
libertarian theorists have responded to this difficulty either by developing a non-standard theory of causation that 
manifests various normative assumptions that are at least contestable and are not in any event particularly linked to 
libertarian values.  Those assumptions include a distinction between acting in the world and passivity whose 
meaning and moral significance are problematic. 
 At least if its key terms are interpreted in an allocative-efficiency-oriented way, I also do not grasp how one 
can justify from a corrective-justice-related perspective the variant of the RESTATEMENT’s ultrahazardous-activity 
provision that would make those engaged in such activities strictly liable even though their location-choices and 
activity-level choices were not more likely than not to have been negligent.  Admittedly, the second and third tort-
related corollaries of liberalism I articulate do imply that participants in an allocatively-efficient ultrahazardous 
activity that is being carried out with due care have an obligation to compensate victims for certain types of losses 
they imposed on them even though (1) the injurers did not want to cause such losses and (2) the losses in question 
were not the “result” of their choice (in the sense of being an effect entailed by a given description of their choice) 
but a consequence of their choice.  (I have borrowed this distinction from Perry, op. cit. supra note 21 at 72-73.)  
However, the second and third corollaries do not imply that participants in ultrahazardous activities are morally 
obligated to compensate their victims for any type of loss they imposed on them and do imply that injurers who are 
not engaged in ultrahazardous activities (whose activities are common or do not create a high probability of a 
substantial loss) are obligated to compensate their victims for certain types of losses they imposed on them. 
 I also do not understand the corrective-justice force of the third proposal in the list the text presents.  
Neither the substantial size of the loss nor the fact that the injurer imposed a unilateral risk on his victim seems 
morally salient to me.  Both the second corollary of liberalism and the third imply that the character of the loss in 
question is more relevant than its victim-valuated equivalent-dollar magnitude to its sufferer’s right of redress.  
Moreover, both practice and principle call into question the moral relevance of the reciprocal character of the risk to 
which the injurer and victims have exposed each other.  In particular, for two reasons, I do not think that the moral 
entitlements of victims are extinguished by the fact that they have imposed reciprocal risks on their injurers.  First, 
although the factual predicate of the reciprocal-risk argument may be realistic in some cases—e.g., in vehicle-
vehicle accidents, it is almost certainly not realistic in the pharmaceutical case or in vehicle-pedestrian accidents.  
Second, even if the two drivers involved in a single-victim, vehicle-vehicle accident in which no-one was negligent 
in the standard Hand sense would be deemed equally at fault if fault were assessed by applying some opportunity-to-
lead-a-life-of-moral-integrity-oriented metric because each imposed the same risk of loss on the other and all other 
relevant considerations were also equal, this fact would not justify the conclusion that the victim should bear all of 
the resulting loss.  Both in principle and in our legal practice, the fact that Y has behaved wrongfully by creating a 
risk that X may suffer a loss does not relieve X of the responsibility to compensate Y for a loss X wrongfully 
imposed on Y—regardless of whether the risk that Y imposed on X ever materialized.  Admittedly, in many 
reciprocal-risk-creation situations, the victim of the actual loss (Y in the above example) will not only have 





                                                                                                                                                            
position of the common law (as represented by §§519-20 of the RESTATEMENT [SECOND] OF 
TORTS) on “abnormally dangerous” activities that are not relieved from liability by their “value” 
to the “community”—at least if in legal practice (1) activities are treated as “abnormally 
dangerous” if they create a risk that an extant person (someone who has the requisite potential to 
lead a life of moral integrity) will be precluded from leading a life of moral integrity and (2) the 
“value” of an activity to the “community” is defined in this context to depend solely on the 
activity’s contribution to the number of days of lives of moral integrity that relevant individuals 
have an opportunity to lead—i.e., if in legal practice activities are deemed to be “strictly liable” 
because ultrahazardous if and only if on balance they disserve the interest of those for whom the 
community is responsible in being in a position to lead a life of moral integrity. 
 
(C) The Third, “Self-Conception-Related” Corollary of Liberalism 
 
 The third corollary of liberalism that is relevant to the tort obligations of the members of 
a liberal, rights-based society is that conduct (say, an invasion of the privacy of a loved one 
motivated exclusively by a desire to learn more about the person loved) may be tortious because 
it injures self-conception-related interests of the victim on which liberals place an especially-high 
value even if the injurer does not obtain illicit satisfaction from the acts in question (e.g., from 
 
contributed to the risk of his suffering a loss himself.  However, as our legal practice (comparative negligence) 
increasingly reflects, the proper way to respond to situations in which the victim’s loss has been caused by his own 
as well as his injurer’s wrongful conduct is not to bar the victim’s recovery but to reduce it by the percentage that his 
fault constituted of the combined fault of the victim and injurer.  For a discussion of various related issues, see 
Jennifer Arlen, Liability for Physical Injury When Injurers as Well as Victims Suffer Losses, 8 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 
411 (1992) and Re-examining Liability Rules When Injurers as Well as Victims Suffer Losses, 10 INT’L REV. L. & 
ECON. 233 (1990). 
 As my discussion of the fourth tort-related corollary of liberalism I will distinguish should make clear, I 
also doubt that injurers who have imposed unilateral risks on their victims should be required on that account to 
compensate them for any type of loss of any size they inflicted on them non-negligently.  My skepticism on this 
issue carries over to the fifth tort-related corollary of liberalism I will delineate, which would impose a 
compensation-duty on injurers who imposed unilateral risks on victims who could not engage in allocatively-
efficient avoidance.  Although the contributory negligence of his victim is certainly relevant to the existence or 
extent of the compensation obligations of someone who would otherwise have a duty to compensate his victims, the 
fact that an injurer’s victim was not contributorily negligent does not establish a basis for holding an injurer liable in 
the absence of a positive reason for doing so. 
 Finally, I do not understand why the fact that an injurer has outcome-responsibility for a particular loss 
(had the ability to foresee and prevent the outcome) that eventuated from a unilateral risk he imposed on his victim 
justicizes requiring the injurer to compensate his victim for the loss in question.  Although I recognize the 
connection between an individual’s having outcome responsibility for some event and that event’s being a product 
of his human agency, I do not see why his outcome-responsibility provides a basis for holding him liable, regardless 





                                                
any tendency they have to inflict pain on, degrade, or control the victim) and even if the act in 
question does not directly preclude its victim from leading a life of moral integrity.  More 
completely, this corollary of liberalism proclaims that an injurer (possibly a government) who 
has invaded his victim’s privacy, significantly harmed his victim’s body, significantly restricted 
his victim’s freedom to choose (given his budget constraint), or taken an unacceptably-high 
percentage or amount of an individual’s earned or unearned income—at least if the “injurer” has 
done so without obtaining the “loser’s” ex ante consent—is obligated to compensate his victim 
for the attendant loss (regardless of whether this outcome was “a result” of the act in question in 
the technical sense of being entailed by that action as described or a consequence of the act) 
unless the choice in question served the ex ante, on-balance, weighted-average interest of the 
relevant population in having and being able to take advantage of the opportunity to lead a life of 
moral integrity.  As I have already indicated, the basic moral commitment of a liberal, rights-
based society is to individuals’ who have the requisite neurological capacity being given the 
opportunity to lead lives of moral integrity by taking their obligations seriously and engaging in 
the dialectical process of formulating a conception of the good and leading a life that is 
consonant with that conception.  That is the sense in which liberalism is individualistic24 and 
committed to individual autonomy.  This commitment to autonomy—to the fundamental interest 
that individuals have in choosing and acting on their own conception of the good, constrained 
only by the identical interest of other members of and participants in their society—carries with 
it a commitment to protecting each individual’s privacy and (within limits) each individual’s 
 
24 Contrary to the claims made by many feminist, communitarian, and critical-legal-studies legal scholars, 
liberalism (or at least the kind of liberalism to which I think our society is committed) does not deny the social 
embeddedness of human experience and choice or the importance of intimate relationships to human flourishing or 
to individuals’ fulfilling their potential to lead lives of moral integrity.  Far from viewing society as consisting of a 
collection of atomized, separate individuals whose identities are not socially conditioned, the type of liberalism to 
which I think our culture is committed recognizes that intimate relationships play an important role in individuals’ 
developing self-respect and a conception of the good and provide the context in which individuals can fulfill their 
obligations and conform their lives to their personal ultimate values.  For some examples from the legal literature 
that contain or report the indicated feminist, communitarian, and critical-legal-studies criticism of liberalism, see 
Kathryn Abrams, Sex Wars Redux: Agency and Coercion in Feminist Legal Theory, 95 COL. L. REV. 304, 326 
(1995); Martha Minow, Part of the Solution, Part of the Problem, 34 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 981, 992-98 (1887); 
Margaret Radin, Property and Personhood, 34 STAN. L. REV. 957, 964-65 (1982); Mark Tushnet, Following the 






                                                
“ownership” of his body, freedom of choice, and ownership of the product of his labor and 
savings. 
 Liberals are committed to protecting privacy both because doing so reinforces the 
individual’s sense of his self-worth (of his being the type of creature that can make up its own 
mind about the good) and because—more concretely—privacy protects an individual’s 
anonymity, secrecy, and solitude in ways that promote his ability to lead a life of moral integrity 
by facilitating his participation in intimate relationships (which often lead to self-discovery and 
provide a context in which he can fulfill his obligations and actualize his conception of the 
good), by providing him with the opportunity to contemplate the moral alternatives  available to 
him, and by reducing the social cost to him of experimenting with different life-styles and value-
choices.25 Liberals are committed to offering the moral-rights holders for whom they are 
responsible considerable protection not just for their physical bodies but also for their freedom of 
choice and the fruits of their labor and savings26 because the provision of such protection fosters 
the kind of self-conception that encourages people to take responsibility for the moral quality of 
their lives. 
 Obviously, there is no mechanical way to derive the implications of the preceding 
analysis for the identity of the concrete “self-conception-related interests” that a liberal society is 
obligated to secure and may choose to secure inter alia by creating a common law of torts that 
imposes compensation-duties on injurers whose choices have disserved the relevant type of self-
conception-related interest or, more generally, “opportunity to lead a life of moral integrity”-
related interest of the population as a whole.  But the contestability of whether a particular loss 
falls within the category of interest that is specially protected does not imply the vacuousness of 
this third tort-law-related corollary of liberalism.  I believe that this liberal concern that people 
consider themselves to be the authors of their own lives grounds a good deal of our moral-rights-
related law—e.g., accounts for the institution of property rights, the Constitutional prohibition of 
government’s taking property except for very special purposes and even then only with just 
compensation, the fact that (except in very unusual circumstances) a private actor who stands 
 
25 I have derived this analysis from Ruth Gavison, Privacy and the Limits of Law, 89 YALE L. J. 421 (1980). 
26 I hasten to add that the level of this type of protection that liberalism warrants is significantly lower than 





                                                
ready to compensate a property-owner ex post may not seize that party’s property even when the 
resource-transfer in question would increase total utility or allocative efficiency,27 and the 
plethora of no-duty holdings in our common law of torts.28
 In order to make the examples I used to illustrate the concrete implications of the second 
tort-related corollary of liberalism appropriate to the analysis of the concrete implications of this 
third tort-related corollary of liberalism, I would have to change those examples solely by 
assuming that—rather than creating a risk that one or more individuals would be killed, suffer 
critical damage to his neurological system, or be subject to life-dominating pain—the choices in 
question create a risk that one or more individuals would suffer lesser losses whose non-
consensual infliction would disfavor not only the potential and actual victims’ taking their lives 
morally seriously but all members of and participants’ in our society doing so by undercutting 
their belief that they are in control of their own lives, at least if the law does not obligate such 
injurers to compensate them for these losses ex post. 
 The basic implications of liberalism for the wrongfulness of choices that create a risk of 
these lesser kinds of losses are the same as their counterparts for choices that create risks of the 
more serious kind of loss with which the second tort-related corollary of liberalism was 
concerned: choosers who created this lesser kind of risk behaved wrongfully unless—after doing 
appropriate research—they concluded that their choice would not disserve the interest of the 
relevant population in having an opportunity to lead a life of moral integrity.  Moreover, when 
the conduct in question creates this type of self-conception risk, liberalism may have two further 
implications, which reflect the fact that liberalism would not condemn individuals’ consenting to 
this kind of risk: 
(1) even if it would not be wrongful for an actor to create this lesser kind of risk 
without obtaining the consent of his potential victims if he could not do so either 
at all or without generating allocative costs or private costs with behavioral 
consequences that made the relevant effort counterproductive from the 
perspective of the “goal” of giving people the opportunity to lead a life of moral 
 
27 In my judgment, the reason for this prohibition is not the allocative efficiency of requiring property-
transfers to be effectuated through voluntary market transactions.  For a discussion that bears on the exceptional 
circumstances in which such property seizures are morally permissible, see the analysis on the liberal “duty to 
rescue” in subsection (F) below. 
28 As I will admit when discussing the sixth, duty-to-rescue-related corollary of liberalism, from a liberal 
perspective, our positive tort law almost certainly errs on the side of finding no duty, though changes in what liberals 





integrity, it would be wrongful for the actor to impose such a risk non-
consensually when he could promote the above goal by securing his potential 
victims’ consent and 
 
(2) even under conditions in which liberalism would not impose a duty on such a 
risk-creator to obtain the ex ante consent of his potential victims, liberalism might 
impose a duty on them to compensate their victims ex post and hence on the 
government of a liberal, rights-based State to require such risk-creators to 
compensate their victims ex post. 
 
I hasten to add that both these additional implications are problematic.  To see why, note that 
they imply that it would be wrongful for an actor not to obtain his potential victim’s consent to or 
not to compensate his actual victim for a loss that might be or was generated by the actor’s non-
wrongful choice when the relevant payment would significantly counter the tendency of the loss 
to militate against the (potential) loser’s taking his life morally seriously by altering his self-
conception by making him feel that he is not the author of his own life.  For this conclusion to be 
consistent with my other conclusions about the tort-related implications of liberalism, it must be 
possible to reconcile it with my conclusions about the duty of members of and participants in a 
liberal, rights-based society to supply help or rescue-services to others (indeed, to supply them 
without having a right to compensation for costs incurred), and I do not see how I can effect this 
reconciliation, given my conclusion that the risk-creator did not act wrongfully in creating the 
relevant risk (was not morally culpable for his victim’s requiring assistance). 
 One final point should be made about this third tort-related corollary of liberalism.  Like 
its predecessors, it does not imply that the members of and participants in a liberal, rights-based 
society will be obligated to avoid creating these kinds of risks if and only if they should have 
perceived their rejection of some related risk-reducing choice to be allocatively inefficient. 
 
(D) The Fourth, Mere-Utility-Related Monetized-Tort-Duty Corollary of Liberalism 
 
 This corollary has a limited domain—i.e., applies only in relation to avoidance-choices 
whose rejection would not preclude its victims from leading lives of moral integrity (see 
corollary two) and would also not militate against their leading such lives by undermining their 
conception of themselves as moral agents (the possibility with which the third corollary is 
concerned).  The monetized-tort-duty corollary is that, when acting in non-political capacities 





victims’ leading lives of moral integrity in ways other than by reducing the general resources at 
their disposal, each morally-responsible member of a liberal, rights-based society has a moral 
duty to make all avoidance-moves that he would conclude would reduce the net certainty-
equivalent equivalent-dollar losses he imposed on others (if he did the morally-appropriate 
amount of research into this issue) that he would find attractive to make if the reduction in such 
net certainty-equivalent equivalent-dollar losses that the relevant avoidance-move would 
generate were internalized to him. 
 This monetized-tort-duty corollary reflects two premises.  The first is that the liberal duty 
of appropriate, equal respect and concern implies that any choice of a moral agent that he 
realizes or should realize will inflict “net harm” on others without preventing them from leading 
lives of moral integrity or militating against their leading such lives by undermining their belief 
that they are the authors of their lives violates his duty of appropriate, equal respect and concern 
if his decision to make that choice was critically influenced by his placing a lower weight on the 
“units of harm” he inflicted on others than he would have done had he experienced that harm 
himself.  The second premise—liberal dualism—is relevant to the way in which the relevant 
“units of harm to others” and “units of benefits to oneself” should be defined.  As I have already 
indicated, the variant of liberal dualism I am employing asserts that, when acting in their non-
political capacities, the individual participants in a liberal State do not have a duty to adjust their 
behavior to take account of variations in the extent to which additional undifferentiated resources 
would contribute to the mere-utility-type welfare of others or the opportunity of others to lead 
lives of moral integrity when the putative obligor is not morally responsible for (in the sense of 
being culpable for) the putative obligee’s poverty or other attributes (e.g., physical or mental 
handicaps, poor education, disposition to take pleasure from material resources, etc.) that affect 
the contribution that additional resources will make to the putative obligee’s mere utility or 
ability to lead a life of moral integrity.  I believe that, in the sense in which I am using this 
concept, liberal dualism implies that the obligations of individuals who are acting in non-political 
capacities when making private choices that will tend to affect the certainty-equivalent accident-
or-pollution losses others confront depend on those choices’ equivalent-dollar effects. 
 Two additional points are relevant at this juncture.  First (roughly speaking), the fourth 





                                                
determine the culpability of an actor in that this formula does base fault-conclusions on a 
comparison of monetized costs and benefits.29  Second, the fourth, monetized-tort-duty corollary 
focuses on certainty-equivalent (i.e., risk-cost adjusted) equivalent-dollar gains and losses while 
its two predecessors focused on weighted-average effects because both mere-utility-related risk 
costs and life-of-moral-integrity-related risk costs involve the kinds of mere-utility losses that 
play no role when the opportunity to lead a life of moral integrity is implicated but are relevant 
when “mere-utility” losses are at stake. 
 I want to reiterate something to which the Introduction already referred.  This explanation 
of the connection between a cleaned-up version of the Hand formula for negligence and the 
liberal duty of appropriate, equal respect provides a moral grounding for using the Hand formula 
to determine an injurer’s liability in some types of tort cases—viz., in cases in which his behavior 
generated “mere utility” losses that he should have anticipated ex ante.  I value this fact not only 
because it improves the fit between our positive tort law and my claim that ours is a liberal, 
rights-based society but also because the existing alleged normative justifications for the Hand 
formula are thoroughly unsatisfactory: 
(1) allocative efficiency is not a goal in itself and (as we shall see) the Hand formula 
is not allocatively efficient in any event and 
 
(2) utilitarianism is highly problematic as a moral norm (both because it fails to take 
relevant differences between individuals seriously and because it may not be 
possible to measure all experiential effects by a single metric), and there is 
certainly no reason to believe that the Hand formula will maximize the utility of 
those creatures whose utility utilitarianism counts.30
 
(E) The Fifth, “Research”-Related Pair of Tort-Related Corollaries of Liberalism 
 
 
29 Admittedly, to be fully consistent with the variant of liberal dualism I believe is warranted, the Hand 
formula would have to be adjusted both (1) to reflect the risk-cost consequences of the relevant avoidance-move 
rejection and (2) to focus on the estimates that the relevant actor should have made of his rejected avoidance-move 
rejection’s allocative rather than private costs and benefits.  For an analysis of the difficulty and occasional 
impossibility of adjusting the Hand formula to take the impact of avoidance-moves on tort-related risk costs into 
account in a way that would yield a formula whose application would maximize allocative efficiency in an 
otherwise-Pareto-perfect world, see Richard S. Markovits, Tort-Related Risk Costs and the Hand Formula for 
Negligence (unpublished manuscript currently under submission and available from the author, 2004). 
30 Nor do I think that one can justify making tort decisions depend exclusively on their allocative efficiency 
by claiming that such a policy would be part of a broader policy-package that would maximize total utility.  See 
Richard S. Markovits, Why Kaplow and Shavell’s “Double-Distortion Argument” Argument Is Wrong, ___ GEO. 





 The word “research” is enquoted in the above heading because in this context I am 
defining “research” expansively not only to refer to “efforts to discover (1) new, safer (i.e., less-
accident-and-pollution-loss-prone) production-techniques, (2) locations whose advantages and 
disadvantages for the relevant use were not previously known but whose use will be less-
accident-and-pollution-cost-prone, and (3) not-yet-discovered product variants whose production 
and consumption combined would be less-accident-and-pollution-loss-prone but also to refer to 
the non-innovative efforts of a potential tort-loss cogenerator to identify (4) the avoidance-moves 
known to others that are available to him and to ascertain (5) the known private and perhaps 
allocative cost and benefits they would generate.  Not surprisingly, in my judgment, the corollary 
of liberalism that controls the research obligations of a potential injurer in a liberal, rights-based 
society depends on the type of loss his research might put him in a position to avoid by using any 
new discovery it yields or any known information it uncovers for him.  If this loss is a mere-
utility loss (with one qualification that will be discussed below), his “research”-obligation will be 
governed by the monetized tort-duty the fourth corollary of liberalism articulates—i.e., he will be 
obligated to do the research that would have been profitable for him to do if the equivalent-dollar 
benefits the use of any discovery it generates or “known” information it reveals to him would 
confer on others were internalized to him (if he placed the same weight on the average 
equivalent-dollar gain the research and its use would confer on others as on the average 
equivalent-dollar it would cost him).  If, on the other hand, the loss that the potential injurer 
might be able to prevent himself from causing by doing “research” and using the “research 
output” is the kind of loss that would preclude the victim from leading a life of moral integrity or 
change his (and perhaps others’) self-conception in a way that would militate against the victim’s 
(or each of the relevant others’) taking his life morally seriously, the potential injurer will be 
obligated to do the research he should have known ex ante would prevent the combination of his 
research and the activity to which it related from reducing the ex ante weighted-average number 
of days of moral integrity that relevant individuals have the opportunity to live if he and others 
made appropriate use of the discovery it yielded or information it brought to his attention. 
 I want to make four points about these tort-related “research” corollaries of liberalism.  
First, the second “research” corollary reflects my conclusion that potential injurers do not have 





to the number of days of moral integrity that relevant individuals have the opportunity to live.  
This conclusion reflects my suspicion that its opposite would militate against individuals’ seizing 
the opportunity to lead a life of moral integrity by undermining their belief that they are the 
authors of their own lives—a suspicion that (as we have seen) underlies the third corollary of 
liberalism just discussed and will also affect my conclusions about the duty of members of and 
participants in a liberal, rights-based society to provide rescue-services to each other (the subject 
of the sixth set of tort-related corollaries of liberalism, which will be discussed below). 
 Second, even if this moral conclusion were not true, potential injurers whose activities 
made a net positive contribution to relevant individuals’ having the opportunity to live days of 
moral integrity would not have to research themselves into the red or into bankruptcy: even if the 
research in question would otherwise increase the opportunity to live days of moral integrity, it 
would not serve this basic liberal “goal” if it induced the researcher to withdraw from an activity 
whose net effect on the opportunity to live days of moral integrity was not negative. 
 Third, neither of the two “research” obligations I have described requires the potential 
injurer to become perfectly informed—to discover all previously-unknown, “desirable” 
avoidance-options or to uncover all known avoidance-options and their known consequences.  
Potential injurers who have fulfilled their “research” obligations will usually still be imperfectly 
informed about the known avoidance-options that are available to them, about those options’ 
private and allocative costs and benefits, about the identity of the conventional research-projects 
they could execute, about the private and allocative costs and benefits of those projects, and 
about their opportunity-to-lead-a-life-of-moral-integrity-related costs and benefits. 
 The qualifications to which my initial account of the “research” obligations of potential 
injurers referred relates to this reality.  The initial account assumed that the potential injurer 
would be perfectly informed about not only the private but also the allocative costs and benefits 
of the various “research” projects he could execute.  That assumption is unrealistic.  In a world in 
which perfect information about “research”-options is not costlessly available to potential 
injurers, their “research” obligations (1) will include an obligation to do appropriate research into 
the identity and allocative or opportunity-to-lead-a-life-of-moral-integrity-related cost and 
benefits of the research-projects they could undertake and (2) to execute the research projects 





                                                
benefits of their research-options were accurate.  Obviously potential injurers whose choices may 
generate mere-utility losses who did not recognize the conceptual difference between the 
relevant allocative figures and their private counterparts or did not know how to estimate the 
relevant allocative parameters—e.g., to move from private-figure estimates to allocative-figure 
estimates—will have based their decisions on private cost and benefit estimates.  And potential 
injurers whose choices may reduce the number of days of lives of moral integrity some victims 
can lead who did not recognize the difference between an opportunity-to-lead-a-life-of-moral-
integrity metric and an allocative-efficiency metric, will have based their decisions on private or 
allocative equivalent-dollar-impact estimates rather than on opportunity-to-lead-a-life-of-moral-
integrity-impact estimates. 
 Fourth, finally, and somewhat relatedly, my discussion of the “research” obligations of 
participants in a liberal, rights-based State has ignored a serious, infinite-regress problem.  In 
order to determine how much “research” he should do, a potential injurer must think about the 
allocative or opportunity-to-lead-a-life-of-moral-integrity-related costs and benefits of doing 
research.  The problem is: he might also be obligated to consider how much he should think 
about the respective costs and benefits of thinking about the respective costs and benefits of 
doing the research and so on and so forth.  My unsatisfactory response to this problem is to cut 
the Gordian Knot—i.e., to assume that the potential researcher will and should just jump in and 
think about the relevant options and their relevant costs and benefits. 
 
(F) The Sixth, Duty-to-Rescue-Oriented Corollary of Liberalism 
 
 The sixth tort-related corollary of liberalism I distinguish summarizes liberalism’s 
implications for the duty to rescue.  I will first discuss what I take to be the basic liberal duty to 
rescue and then discuss a qualification to that basic duty that may provide a liberal justification 
for our society’s failure to impose a legal duty to rescue in some situations in which one might 
think that liberalism would impose such a duty.31
 
 
31 In general, our society—indeed, all societies in the common-law family—imposes legal duties to rescue in 
far fewer situations than liberalism would require.  It should be noted, however, that in recent years, legal duties to 
provide assistance have been imposed on several additional categories of potential “rescuers”—e.g., on store-owners 





                                                                                                                                                            
 Two initial points should be made about the basic liberal duty to rescue or provide 
assistance.  First, this basic duty arises only when there is some chance that the potential rescuee 
will otherwise suffer a loss that would eliminate his opportunity to lead a life of moral integrity 
(say, by killing him) or possibly that would militate against his seizing his opportunity to lead 
such a life by undermining his belief that he is the author of his own life—at least when the loss 
in question will not produce such effects solely by reducing the victim’s material resources 
below the level required to survive or to have a meaningful opportunity to lead a life of moral 
integrity in the society in question.  Second, the basic liberal duty to rescue or provide assistance 
is an accommodation of two corollaries of liberalism that have already been articulated that have 
conflicting implications for the duty in question.  In the one direction, liberalism’s commitment 
to valuing individuals’ having the opportunity to lead a life of moral integrity implies that, 
ceteris paribus, members of and participants in a liberal, rights-based society have a duty to 
prevent co-members and co-participants from suffering losses that would preclude them from 
leading such lives and to prevent preventable losses whose non-prevention manifests a kind of 
disrespect for the victim that is bad in itself and also bad because it alters the victim’s (and 
perhaps various observers’) self-conception in a way that militates against his (their) taking his 
life (their lives) morally seriously.  In the other direction, the liberal commitment to valuing 
individuals’ not only having but also seizing the opportunity to lead a life of moral integrity 
implies that, ceteris paribus, obligations should not be imposed on individuals that would 
militate against their taking their own lives morally seriously either by creating a risk that they 
will be damaged in a way that will preclude them from leading a life of moral integrity or by 
causing them to feel that their life is not their own—i.e., by militating against their leading a life 
of moral integrity by undermining their belief in their control over their own lives and 
derivatively in their moral agency.  My tentative conclusion is that, from the perspective of 
liberalism, the following basic duty to rescue (which I believe resembles the moral duty many 
members of our society believe we all have) would represent the proper accommodation of these 
two corollaries of liberalism: members of and participants in liberal, rights-based societies are 
morally obligated to take those steps they can take to prevent other members of and participants 
 
invitees.  See William Powers, Book Review of MARSHALL SHAPO, THE DUTY TO ACT: TORT-LAW, POWER, AND PUBLIC 





in the society in question (including those to whom they have made no relevant promise, those 
with whom they have no relevant status relationship, and those whose need for help they did not 
culpably create) from suffering a loss that would preclude them from or strongly militate against 
their living a life of moral integrity that they can take without (1) incurring a significant risk of 
substantial bodily injury or death or (2) devoting an exorbitant amount of time to the rescue 
effort. 
 The second duty-to-rescue-related corollary of liberalism—which I call “the non-
uniqueness qualification”—qualifies the basic duty to rescue.  According to this qualification, a 
potential rescuer whom liberalism would otherwise obligate to provide assistance to someone in 
need will not have this duty if he is not the best-placed potential rescuer or perhaps, even more 
comprehensively, if one or more other moral agents are in a position to provide assistance that 
liberalism would obligate one or more such others to provide if the other in question were the 
only potential rescuer who could prevent a kind of loss whose possible occurrence can trigger a 
liberal duty to rescue without incurring a significant risk of substantial bodily harm or death and 
without devoting a prohibitive amount of time to the rescue. 
 I can offer three far-from-satisfactory justifications for or accounts of this non-uniqueness 
qualification—i.e., for the conclusion that an actor who is not uniquely-well-placed to supply 
rescue services that liberalism would otherwise obligate him to supply or is not the only member 
of the set of potential rescuers who would individually be obligated to attempt the rescue if the 
relevant set included only him will not have a duty to provide the help in question.  The first 
possible justification is convincing when it applies but does not apply to many of the relevant 
situations.  If an individual who would be obligated to effectuate a rescue if he were the only 
member of the set of potential rescuers for whom that assertion was true reasonably believed that 
someone else equally capable of effectuating the rescue would definitely attempt to do so if he 
did not or, more comprehensively, if he reasonably believed that his attempt to effectuate the 
rescue would not increase the probability that the rescuee would be saved, he would not be 
obligated to make the relevant rescue-attempt (he would not be at fault for failing to make that 
attempt). 
 The next two “justifications” for the non-uniqueness qualification to the basic liberal duty 





                                                
call “practical reasons.”  The first is that a decision to hold liable each potential rescuer whom 
liberalism would obligate to attempt a rescue if he were the only potential rescuer may produce 
inferior outcomes from both a rights-related interest and mere-utility perspective by making it 
less likely that the potential rescuer who was best-placed to attempt the rescue from a liberal 
perspective would actually attempt the rescue.  Normative/conceptual objections aside, this 
argument is vulnerable to empirical attack: to objections that focus on the realisticness of its 
possible implicit assumptions that the potential rescuers will themselves know the identity of the 
best-placed potential rescuer ex ante and that the courts will be able to identify this best-placed 
potential rescuer ex post. 
 The third possible justification for the non-uniqueness qualification of the basic liberal 
duty to rescue is prudential in a sense that I have argued elsewhere 32 renders its consideration 
morally illegitimate—i.e., inconsistent with our society’s moral commitments.  A decision not to 
hold liable each non-unique, otherwise-culpable potential rescuer in this type of case may be 
morally attractive (even if it does not induce the government or any other non-governmental 
entity to supply equally-desirable or more desirable rescue-attempts) because it reduces the 
likelihood that the government will impose liability on a particular non-unique, non-performing 
potential rescuer (rather than on another non-unique, non-performing potential rescuer or on no 
potential rescuer) for illicit reasons—e.g., because of the political opposition, race, ethnicity, etc. 
of the potential rescuer who was singled out. 
 Two related issues remain to be discussed: When, if ever, does liberalism imply that 
someone who has attempted a rescue he was obligated to attempt has a moral right to be 
compensated for his efforts, and if liberalism does imply that a rescue-attempter is entitled to 
compensation, by what standard should his compensation be determined?  It seems clear to me 
that liberalism implies that a potential rescuee who was culpable for his imperilment (partly 
because of the burden his danger-creating choices imposed on his potential rescuers) is obligated 
to compensate anyone who reasonably attempted to rescue him for the “full” cost the rescue-
attempter reasonably incurred to attempt the rescue and collect compensation.  Note that I did not 
say that the potential rescuee had an obligation to pay the rescue-attempter a supra-
 
32 See RICHARD S. MARKOVITS, MATTERS OF PRINCIPLE: LEGITIMATE LEGAL ARGUMENT AND 





                                                
compensatory fee or the fee that would be most-allocatively-efficient,33 given its impact on the 
number of individuals who put themselves in a position to make a rescue-attempt, the number of 
such individuals who attempt given rescues, the nature of the rescue-attempts that are executed, 
the choices that potential rescuees make to avoid becoming imperiled, and the decisions that 
potential rescuees make about whether to accept or reject offers of rescue as well as the myriad 
of Pareto imperfections that cause the private costs and benefits of these interconnected sets of 
choices to diverge from their allocative counterparts.  It also seems clear to me that liberalism 
implies that the formula for the rescue-attempter’s compensation should include (1) the private 
opportunity cost to him of devoting time to the rescue-attempt, (2) (on some definitions, 
redundantly) the “unpleasantness” cost of attempting the rescue as opposed to spending time in 
some experientially-neutral way (in some way that was neither enjoyable nor unpleasant), (3) the 
risk costs he incurred to make the rescue-attempt, given the possibility that he might not be 
compensated for the full private cost of his efforts, (4) the private transaction costs he reasonably 
incurred to secure his compensation, and (5) the risk costs he incurred because it was not certain 
that he would be fully reimbursed for these transaction costs.  I am uncertain whether liberalism 
implies that a potential rescuer’s award should be reduced by the intrinsic equivalent-dollar value 
to him of having attempted and perhaps succeeded in effectuating the rescue. 
 I am also not sure about the implications of liberalism for the compensation duties of a 
potential rescuee who became imperiled through no fault of his own.  I am inclined to say that 
such a potential rescuee is not obligated to compensate his rescue-attempter, though as a policy 
matter this conclusion is disfavored by its tendency to reduce the number of desirable rescue-
attempts that are actually made as well as the number of people who desirably put themselves in 
a position to make such desirable rescue-attempts (given the probability that information-
imperfections and transaction costs with different origins will preclude the State from securing 
desirable rescue-attempts and desirable investments in rescue-capacity by threatening to fine or 
prosecute those who fail to make them or promising to compensate those who do make them).  
 
33 For an exhaustive and exhausting treatment of this issue, see Richard S. Markovits, Marine-Salvage Law: 
A Third-Best-Economic-Efficiency Analysis (unpublished book manuscript available from the author, 2004).  For a 
somewhat less exhaustive and exhausting treatment of this issue, see Marine-Salvage Law and Marine-Salvage 
Policy: A Second-Best and Third-Best Allocative-Efficiency Analysis (unpublished Article manuscript under 





Perhaps the proper response to this problem would be for the State as opposed to the imperiled 
party to reward people who attempt rescues of imperiled individuals who were innocent of their 
predicament. 
 
(G) The Seventh, Duty-of-Repair Tort-Related Corollary of Liberalism 
 
 The seventh tort-related corollary of liberalism is that individuals who have committed 
tortious wrongful acts that have harmed a moral-rights holder have (1) a duty to mitigate the 
harm they have caused—in particular, by making harm-mitigating choices that promote life-of-
moral-integrity-related interests on balance when the harm is life-of-moral-integrity-related and 
by making choices that are allocatively efficient when the harm is mere-utility-related—and (2) a 
prima facie duty to compensate their victims fully for the losses they imposed on them.  I want to 
make six points about a tortious wrongdoer’s compensation-duty. 
 First, I believe that a wrongful avoidance-move rejector in a liberal, rights-based society 
has a duty to compensate his potential accident-or-pollution-loss victims for the risk costs he 
imposed on them by altering the probability distribution of the uncompensated accident and 
pollution losses they might incur, regardless of whether the accident or pollution-event in 
question actually occurs.  Second, I believe that a wrongful injurer’s duty to compensate his 
victims extends beyond the conventional loss his wrongful act inflicted on them (and the risk 
costs the possibility of the loss’ occurring and their not being compensated for the loss imposed 
on them) to include the private transaction costs they reasonably incurred to secure compensation 
from him (and the risk costs associated with their not being compensated for any reasonable 
transaction costs they incur to pursue their tort claim).  I recognize the contestability of the 
“reasonableness” of both particular expenses entitled victims incur when pursuing their claim 
and the overall amount of such expenses they incur.  I will not now try to develop a protocol for 
determining the reasonableness of any given expenditure an entitled tort victim makes to pursue 
his claim.  However, I will say that, if a tortious wrongdoer has a duty to compensate his victim 
for the transaction costs they incur to obtain compensation from him, the victim has a duty not to 
abuse the wrongdoer by incurring “unreasonable” dispute-prosecution costs.  Third, I think that, 
when the wrongdoer’s tortious act was motivated by his disrespect for the victim-plaintiff in 





                                                
entailed as well as for any material losses, physical injuries, physical-injury-related pain and 
suffering, reasonable dispute-prosecuting transaction costs, and loss-and-transaction-cost-related 
risk costs it caused the victim to incur. 
 Fourth, in a liberal, rights-based society, the victim of a tortious act may well have a 
moral right that enough costs be inflicted on his wrongdoer to prevent the wrongdoer from 
profiting from his wrong.  Although I realize that most corrective-justice discussions do not 
address this possible “corrective-justice” interest of a wronged party, I can see at least four 
grounds for concluding that a wronged victim has such an interest.  First, the wronged victim 
might have a property interest that was violated by the tort (say, trespass) and be entitled to the 
profits the wrongdoer realized from his wrong (to the disgorgement of profits) on this account.  
Second, the wronged victim might have a legitimate interest in the wrongdoer’s not profiting 
from the wrongful act that was wrongful because it manifested the injurer’s particular disrespect 
for his potential victim.  Third, the wronged victim might have a legitimate, retributive interest in 
the wrongdoer’s being punished (though this interest would favor the imposition of enough 
sanctions on the wrongdoer to make his wrongful act ex post unprofitable as opposed to ex post 
break-even).  And fourth, a wronged victim who was not singled out for disrespect by his injurer 
might have an entitlement in common with all other members of and participants in his liberal, 
rights-based society that no one profit by behaving disrespectfully.  I should add that, in this last 
case, the particular victim would not have a right that the wrongdoer be required to pay his direct 
victim enough damages to deprive him of his profits: if a liberal State has a duty to prevent 
wrongdoers from profiting from their wrongs in these cases, it can discharge that duty by 
requiring wrongdoers to pay civil or criminal fines or to put in jail-time in addition to 
compensating their victims when such compensation would not eliminate the profits their 
wrongdoing yielded.34  Not only would such alternative methods of preventing wrongdoers from 
 
 
34 I am therefore partially disagreeing with Ernest Weinrib’s “correlativity thesis.”  On the one hand, I agree 
with Weinrib that a tortious wrongdoer’s liability to his traditional victims is limited to the loss he imposed on them 
(at least if that loss is defined to include the risk costs, reasonable transaction costs, and insult costs the wrong 
imposed on them or caused them to incur) even when the wrong would remain profitable after these losses were 
repaired.  On the other, I believe that a liberal, rights-based State may have a duty to supplement such compensatory 
damage-awards with enough civil fines and criminal penalties to render the tortious wrongdoer’s wrongdoing 
unprofitable.  See Ernest Weinrib, Restitutionary Damages as Corrective Justice, 1 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES IN LAW 
1 (1999).  Admittedly, as I have already indicated, at least when the wrongdoer’s wrong was not motivated (in 





                                                                                                                                                            
profiting from their wrongs prevent their victims from obtaining windfall gains, they would also 
tend to increase allocative efficiency 
(1) by eliminating the incentive supra-compensatory damages would give potential 
victims to decrease allocative efficiency by putting themselves in harm’s way by 
rejecting avoidance-moves whose rejection is either not assessed for contributory 
negligence or would sometimes mistakenly be found not to be contributorily 
negligent and 
 
(2) by providing revenue to the government and thereby obviating its raising the 
funds in question in alternative ways that would decrease allocative efficiency. 
 
 The positive law on these issues is complicated.  Punitive damages seem to be 
discretionary and are not available in all cases in which the wrongdoer would profit from his 
wrong if required to do no more than compensate his victims fully for their loss.  Instead, 
punitive damages tend to be deemed appropriate when the injurer has behaved in a way that is 
worse than merely negligent—has been grossly negligent, has intentionally committed a 
wrongful act, or has actively desired to inflict the loss he generated on the actual victim or on 
someone.  When the tort has violated a property right of its victim, the victim is held to be 
entitled to choose between a tort action in which he would be entitled to damages and an action 
in restitution in which he would be entitled to recover the “profits” the wrong generated for the 
wrongdoer (to disgorgement).  The word “profits” is enquoted in the previous sentence because 
it is sometimes measured by the savings the wrongdoer secured by not paying the victim for the 
right to use his property or paying someone else for equivalent property and is sometimes 
measured by a higher sum equal to the profits the wrongdoer achieved by using the victim’s 
property rather than doing without it or any equivalent to it.  In practice, courts tend to award the 
higher sum when the wrongdoer behaved more wrongfully (e.g., committed the wrong 
intentionally rather than carelessly). 
 The fit between the positive law and the various possible bases for concluding that 
victims have a right that their wrongful injurers not profit their wrongs is also difficult to assess.  
The fact that property-right holders are entitled to prevent their injurers from profiting from their 
 
entitlement to the State’s fulfilling this duty.  Although it seems to me that wrongdoers have a moral duty to 
surrender the profits they earned from wrongdoing to the State, they clearly would not have such a duty if their 





                                                
wrongs and to require wrongful injurers who have behaved really badly to pay them an amount 
that would make the wrong ex post unprofitable, legal-transaction-cost consequences aside, is 
consistent with the property-based account of this victim right (and with the liberal [and 
libertarian] accounts of the importance of property rights).  The fact that no legal right to 
punitive damages or profit-disgorgement is recognized in cases of ordinary negligence when the 
invalid interest is  not a property interest may in part reflect an assessment of the insultingness of 
ordinary negligence and in part a recognition that luck plays a substantial role in determining 
whether a given negligent choice causes a loss as well as the magnitude of a loss it generates.35
 Fifth, I want to raise the possibility that—in a liberal, rights-based society—a tortious 
wrongdoer’s moral duty to compensate his victims may be somewhat pro-active (may extend 
beyond a duty to respond appropriately to justified demands for compensation from his wronged 
victims to include a duty to incur a reasonable amount of expenses to identify and compensate 
his victims).  Sixth, I want to point out that, although a tortious wrongdoer’s duty to compensate 
his victims is diminished or extinguished by his victim’s securing partial or total compensation 
from another source other than the wrongdoer’s own insurance-company (say, the victim’s 
private tort-loss insurer or the government), such cross-payments do not extinguish but merely 
transfer the wrongdoer’s duty to pay from a duty to pay his victims to a duty to pay his victim’s 
payor. 
 
(2) The Tort-Related Obligations of a Liberal, Rights-Based State 
 
(A) The General Tort-Related Obligations of the Governments of a Liberal, Rights-Based 
State 
 
 A rights-based State of moral integrity has a general duty to maximize the extent to 
which the rights-related interests of those for whom it is responsible are secured and has a related 
prima facie duty to minimize the damage to rights-related interests that is done by tortious acts.  
This duty is prima facie because it does not require a liberal, rights-based State to secure this 
result when doing so would necessitate its sacrificing weightier rights-related interests.  I do not 
 
35 Some canonical cases in this area are Beck v. Northern Natural Gas Co., 170 F.3d 1018 (10th Cir. 1999) 
and Olwell v. Nye & Nissen Co., 173 P.2d 652 (Wash. 1946).  See also Maier Brewing Co. v. Fleishmann Distilling 
Corp., 309 F.2d 117 (9th Cir. 1968); John P. Dawson, Restitution Without Enrichment, 61 B.U. L. REV. 513 (1981); 





                                                
think that this last qualification is empirically important in the case of the contemporary United 
States, but I can imagine situations in which general social poverty put a government of a liberal, 
rights-based State in a position in which it could not protect the tort-related moral interests of its 
subjects without generating allocative transaction costs and productivity disincentives that would 
prevent it from providing its subjects with a sufficient amount of the money, specific goods and 
services, and specific opportunities that would significantly contribute to their having the 
opportunity to lead lives of moral integrity for the effort to protect tort-rights to reduce the 
protection given to moral-rights-related interests on balance. 
 A society’s government can fulfill its duty to minimize the damage that wrongful acts 
(and in some causation-situations acts that may not be wrongful36) do to the tort-related moral-
rights-related interests of those for whom it is responsible in a wide variety of ways: by 
educating its subjects to render them more likely to fulfill their liberal duty of appropriate, equal 
respect and concern when considering possibly-tortious choices, by imposing civil fines or 
criminal penalties on tortious wrongdoers, and/or by giving tort victims a legal entitlement to 
obtain compensation from their wrongful injurers and enabling them to take advantage of this 
entitlement (by giving them easy and inexpensive access to justice, by supplying them directly 
with the information they require to win their cases, and/or by offering rewards to non-victim 
informants who provide relevant information), etc.  Whether liberal, rights-based States have a 
moral duty to make wrongful injurers pay enough damages, civil fines, and criminal penalties 
(including jail-time) to prevent them from profiting from their wrongdoing depends in part on 
whether such a policy is an essential part of any morally-requisite tort-deterrence scheme and in 
 
36 I have in mind step-function damage situations in which a set of avoidance-move rejections none of which 
is wrongful collectively reduce allocative efficiency or disserve the interest of relevant individuals in having an 
opportunity to lead a life of moral integrity.  Assume a case in which the relevant loss is a “mere utility” loss, that no 
such loss will be generated if 0 to 49.99 units of pollution are put into the atmosphere, that $100 in pollution losses 
will be generated if 50 to 99.99 units of pollution are put into the atmosphere, and that in the original situation, 30 
polluters know that each is putting 2 units of pollution into the atmosphere that he could have avoided emitting at a 
cost of $2.  In this situation, allocative efficiency could be increased by $88 if six of the thirty polluters avoided 
though no individual polluter originally made an allocatively-inefficient and hence wrongful choice: at least if as 
seems probable, no individual could induce others to follow his example, each would assume that his avoidance 
would cost him $2 and effect no change in the pollution loss generated.  My inclination is to conclude that, in this 
situation, unless the government would have to generate at least $88 in allocative transaction costs and other types of 
public-finance-related allocative “costs” to induce six of the polluters to avoid completely (or enough polluters to 
avoid to a lesser extent to reduce the number of units of pollution from 60 to 49.99 or fewer), it would be obligated 





part on whether one concludes that actual tort victims (or the members of the society in general) 
have a moral right that tortfeasors be prevented from profiting from their tortious wrongs.  As 
already indicated, if a liberal, rights-based State has a duty to prevent wrongdoers from profiting 
from their wrongs, that duty does not imply that any wrongdoer’s victims are morally entitled to 
have him pay them sufficient damages to render his wrongdoing unprofitable. 
 A summary may be useful.  I have just argued that the government(s) of liberal, rights-
based societies have important tort-related duties.  However, at least if I am correct in concluding 
that the members of such a society do not have a moral right to receive compensation from their 
wrongdoer if the government insures them against tort-losses, such a society is not obligated to 
create a corrective-justice-oriented law of torts, either legislatively or by creating common-law 
courts and authorizing their judges to make binary decisions that secure the relevant corrective-
justice-related interests of the parties before them and the rights-related interests of various 
others affected by the relevant legal outcomes.  However, one way that liberal, rights-based 
States can discharge part of their tort-related duties is to create and operate such common-law 
courts. 
 
(B) The Obligations of Adjudicators of Common-Law Tort Disputes in a Liberal, Rights-
Based State 
 
 Part 2 will be concerned with the moral legitimacy of judges’ resolving common-law tort 
cases in the way that is allocatively efficient when this resolution cannot be justified in 
corrective-justice terms.  To prepare the way for this discussion, I want to explain why it is 
morally impermissible in a liberal, rights-based State (i.e., inconsistent with such a State’s moral-
rights commitments) for judges to make decisions in common-law cases that cannot be justified 
in liberal-corrective-justice terms.  Four points are salient.  First, the fact that the cases in 
question are common-law cases implies that their internally-right resolution cannot be derived 
from (1) legislation passed by official State legislative decisionmakers or (2) constitutional texts 
that do something other than articulate the moral rights of those for whom the relevant State is 
responsible and the moral duties that the relevant State has in relation to those rights.  Second, 
the preceding point implies that any attempt by a common-law judge to resolve a common-law 
(tort) case in other than corrective-justice terms would amount to an exercise of legislative power 





                                                
based on the plaintiff’s pre-existing corrective-justice rights imposes a legal duty on the 
defendant that he did not have at the time he rejected the choice the court says he is legally 
obligated to have made, it seems accurate to conclude that defendants in such cases have been 
subjected to ex post facto legislation.  Fourth, ex post facto legislation violates the liberal duty of 
appropriate, equal respect and concern for at least four somewhat-overlapping reasons: 
(1) because ex post facto legislation is unauthorized, it fails to show the respect that is 
due to members of the society in question by denying them the ability to be the 
authors of the laws that constrain them; 
 
(2) it denies its victims political procedural-fairness—i.e., various opportunities they 
would have to protect themselves in the normal legislative process37; 
 
(3) it fails to show the society’s members appropriate respect and concern by denying 
its victims fair notice; and 
 
(4) it fails to show the society’s members appropriate, equal respect and concern by 
facilitating the government’s punishing its political opponents and disadvantaging 
the targets of the prejudices of government officials and/or their constituents (by 
reducing the extent to which the government is inhibited from imposing losses on 
particular individuals by the facts that legislative decisions have more widespread 
applicability and are more difficult to reverse than judicial decisions). 
 
Fifth, if I am correct that the moral principles on which a rights-based State is committed to 
grounding its moral-rights discourse and conduct are inside its common law, judges who resolve 
common-law cases by reference to those principles (and the corrective-justice notions they 
entail) will be finding the law and not promulgating new legislation (even when their conclusions 
are novel and their reasoning innovative in that they reflect insights into the concrete 
implications of our society’s moral commitments and/or refinements in the conceptualization of 
those commitments that no other judge, legal scholar, or legal or philosophical commentator 
respectively had or made), those who are disadvantaged by correct common-law decisions will 
 
 
37 I admit that this objection may be unjustified for both conceptual and empirical reasons.  The conceptual 
problem relates to the difficulty of providing a coherent or persuasive concretization of the political-participation or 
political-outcome rights of the members of a liberal, rights-based State (beyond the right of such individuals to have 
the State act to protect the non-political-rights rights-related interests of those for whom it is responsible).  For a 
discussion of this difficulty, see Daniel S. Markovits, Democratic Disobedience, ___ YALE L.J. ___ (2005) 
(forthcoming).  For the possibility that the relevant concern is unjustified for empirical reasons (that the access and 





                                                                                                                                                            
not be victims of ex post facto legislation, both sides of a common-law dispute will have fair 
notice of the terms on which it will be decided (since members of and participants in a rights-
bases society are responsible for knowing both the abstract moral principles to which 
membership or participation in that society commits them and the concrete corollaries of those 
principles), and the probability that government will use the common-law courts to punish its 
opponents and disadvantage the targets of its prejudice will be reduced (though, given the 
contestability of the correct answer to many corrective-justice questions, the opportunity for 
corruption will not be eliminated). 
 
2. The Possible Allocative (Economic) Inefficiency of the Internally-Correct Resolution of 
Corrective-Justice Claims in Common-Law Tort-Suits in a Liberal, Rights-Based Society 
 
 Part 2 delineates and explores twelve reasons why the resolution of either common-law 
tort-issues or common-law tort-cases that is correct as a matter of law in a liberal, rights-based 
State may not be allocatively efficient even if no allocative-efficiency problems are caused by (1) 
any tort doctrine not required by our liberal commitments that is not first-best-allocatively-
efficient (allocatively efficient in an otherwise-Pareto-perfect world), (2) the transaction costs 
that are generated by the making, defending, and processing of tort claims, or (3) any mistake of 
the relevant tort cogenerators or adjudicative decisionmakers other than those this section 
discusses. 
 
A. The Fact That the Members of and Participants in a Liberal, Rights-Based Society Have 
No Duty to Make the Choices that Maximize Their Equivalent-Dollar Gains When Those 
Choices Are Not Require by the Rights of Others or the Actor’s Duty to Take His Life 
Morally Seriously 
 
 Liberalism’s implications for the duties that the members of and participants in a liberal, 
rights-based society are complicated and contestable.  This section is based on the following 
tentative conclusions: 
(1) the members of and participants in a liberal, rights-based society do have a duty to 
take their lives morally seriously—to lead a life of moral integrity; 
 
 
imperfections associated with legislative-branch and executive-branch legislation), see LAWRENCE G. SAGER, 





                                                
(2) this duty grounds the duty of the governments of a liberal, rights-based State to 
put these individuals in a position to lead such a life by ensuring that they have 
the health care, police protection, nutrition, housing, clothing, education, 
experiences, and exposure to alternative value-choices and lifestyles that will 
contribute significantly to their ability to lead lives of moral integrity and by 
preventing them from making choices to kill themselves (in most circumstances), 
to sell themselves into slavery, or (in most circumstances) to become addicted to 
some drug that will deprive them of a meaningful opportunity to lead a life of 
moral integrity;38
 
(3) the fact that a liberal, rights-based State’s members have a duty to lead a life of 
moral integrity does not imply that the governments of a liberal, rights-based 
State have a duty to induce these individuals to lead lives of moral integrity by 
penalizing their failure to do so since what is valued is individuals’ freely 
choosing to lead lives of moral integrity, though it may imply that the 
governments of a liberal, rights-based State have a duty to explain the 
attractiveness of leading lives of moral integrity; and 
 
(4) the individual members of and participants in a liberal, rights-based State have no 
duty to maximize their equivalent-dollar interests when their failure to do so 
would not violate the rights of others or their own duty to lead a life of moral 
integrity. 
 
 This fourth conclusion has the following corollary: even if potential avoiders’ appropriate 
estimates of the equivalent-dollar costs and benefits that their various avoidance-options would 
generate were always accurate and even if the accident law of a liberal, rights-based State of 
perfect moral integrity would always require accident-participants to make all those avoidance-
moves that would reduce the certainty-equivalent equivalent-dollar loss they imposed on others 
that would be allocatively efficient for them to make and only those avoidance-moves in this 
category that would be allocatively efficient for them to make, the common law of torts of such a 
State would not legally obligate potential injurers who belonged to the set of potential victims of 
their own injurious conduct always to make allocatively-efficient avoidance-choices.  In 
particular, given that private actors in a liberal, rights-based State do not have an obligation to 
maximize their own equivalent-dollar interests when their failure to do so would not violate any 
other rights or obligations, a liberal, rights-based State would not be morally obligated to impose 
 
38 The governments of liberal, rights-based States might also be obligated to prohibit and prevent prostitution 
and polygamy if there were sufficiently good reason to believe that participation in these activities or relationships 





a legal duty on injurer-victims to make an avoidance-move that would increase allocative 
efficiency when the avoidance-move in question would not on balance decrease the certainty-
equivalent equivalent-dollar harm the chooser imposed on others (when the sign of the move’s 
impact on allocative efficiency was critically influenced by the fact that it would reduce the 
certainty-equivalent equivalent-dollar loss the injurer-victim in question would inflict on 
himself).  This conclusion implies that the common law of torts of a liberal, rights-based State 
would fail to increase allocative efficiency by imposing a legal duty on relevant actors to make 
avoidance-moves whose allocative efficiency was critically affected by the equivalent-dollar 
gains those moves would enter on the potential injurer/victims in question. 
 
B. The Fact That, in Many Circumstances, a Liberal, Rights-Based State’s Members and 
Participants Will Not Be Obligated to Make Ex Ante Allocatively-Efficient Rescue 
Attempts 
 
 My discussion of the duty-to-rescue-oriented corollaries of liberalism argued that, for two 
or possibly three reasons, the members of and participants in a liberal, rights-based society may 
not have a duty to execute an ex ante allocatively-efficient rescue-attempt.  First, when the 
potential rescuee will suffer a “mere-utility loss” if he is not rescued and the potential rescuer has 
no promise-related, status-related, or culpable-causation-related duty to attempt the relevant 
rescue, the potential rescuer will have no duty to attempt the relevant rescue even if its execution 
would be ex ante allocatively efficient.  Second, even if the potential rescuee may be prevented 
from leading a life of moral integrity if he is not rescued, the potential rescuer will have no duty 
to attempt a rescue if the rescue-attempt would subject him to a significant risk of substantial 
bodily harm or death, regardless of whether he had the option of executing a rescue-attempt that 
would be ex ante allocatively efficient.  Third, and more contestably, even if each individual 
member of a multi-member set of potential rescuers would be morally obligated to execute an 
allocatively-efficient rescue-attempt if he were the only person in a position to make such a 
rescue-attempt, no individual potential rescuer may be obligated to make the ex ante allocatively-
efficient rescue-attempt when more than one person way in a position to make such a rescue-
attempt.  If for any of these reasons the members of or participants in a liberal, rights-based 
society are not morally obligated to make an ex ante allocatively-efficient rescue-attempt, the 





                                                
impose a legal duty on such parties to make ex ante allocatively-efficient rescue-attempts even if 
it would be allocatively efficient for it to do so. 
 
C. The Fact That the Value or Moral Significance That Liberals Assign to the Pleasure That 
Invaders of Privacy, Batterers, Rapists, and False Imprisoners Obtain Because Their Acts 
Inflict Pain on, Degrade, and Control Their Victims Differs From the Value That Would 
Be Assigned to Such (Illicit) Pleasures in an Allocative-Efficiency Analysis 
 
 The fact that invasions of privacy, batteries, rapes, and false imprisonment give their 
perpetrators pleasure by inflicting pain on, degrading, and/or controlling their victims may 
increase their allocative efficiency—in particular, will affect their allocative efficiency by (1) the 
number of dollars the relevant injurers would have to obtain in an inherently-neutral way to be 
left as well off as these pleasures left them minus (2) the net external costs (plus the net external 
benefits) that (I hope) the generation of such pleasures impose on others who disapprove or 
approve of individuals’ obtaining such pleasures.39  Such illicit pleasures may therefore either 
favor or disfavor the allocative efficiency of the acts that generate them.  By way of contrast, 
 
 
39 At least orally, some Law & Economics scholars contend that the equivalent-dollar gains and losses 
individuals experience because they approve or disapprove of some act or state of affairs should not be counted in 
allocative-efficiency analysis.  See, e.g., Matthew D. Adler and Eric A. Posner, Implementing Cost-Benefit Analysis 
When Preferences Are Distorted in COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS: LEGAL, ECONOMIC, AND PHILOSOPHICAL 
PERSPECTIVES (MATTHEW D. ADLER AND ERIC A. POSNER, eds.) 269, 276-77 (2002).  However, these scholars have 
no principled argument for this conclusion—i.e., their only justification for it is the supposed difficulty of measuring 
such equivalent-dollar gains and losses.  In fact, in our worse-than-second-best world (in which Pareto imperfections 
abound and both data and analysis are inevitably costly and data is virtually always imperfect), I am not convinced 
that it will be less practicable to estimate such moral-value-generated equivalent-dollar gains and losses than to 
estimate the kinds of equivalent-dollar consequences on which conventional allocative-efficiency analysis focuses or 
is supposed to focus.  I should say that some philosophers have reached a related conclusion that the overall 
desirability of a choice should not be affected by so-called “external preferences” (preferences for or against other 
people’s gains and losses) for a very different reason—viz., because, in their view, a procedure that counts external 
preferences is inegalitarian in that it counts more than once the utility of anyone for whose utility there are net 
external preferences and less than once the utility of anyone for whose utility there are net external dispreferences.  I 
disagree with this latter position (taken, for example, by RONALD DWORKIN in TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY at 234-38 
[1977]).  To my mind, taking external preferences into account is not counting the utility of the relevant winner 
twice.  The direct winner’s utility-gain counts only directly.  The fact that it counts indirectly as well when it shows 
up in someone else’s utility function does  not involve double-counting any more than would counting the utility 
someone else obtained because the utility-gain of the direct winner induced the direct winner to change his behavior 
in ways that benefited the second party in question.  Of course, from some value-perspectives, some external 
preferences and dispreferences (such as an external dispreference based on a prejudice) might not deserve to be 
given a positive weight (indeed, might even be assigned a negative weight) at the overall-desirability-evaluation 
stage of the policy-evaluation process (indeed, might [as the text indicates] render the choice in question rights-
violative if it critically affected the chooser’s choice).  See the immediately-following text and note 40 infra.  For 





                                                                                                                                                            
such illicit pleasures will never favor the moral permissibility of the acts that yield them from a 
liberal perspective.  Indeed, from a liberal perspective, the fact that the acts in question generate 
such illicit pleasures may render them morally impermissible—i.e., may count against them 
more severely than the statement that they would be assigned a negative value would suggest.  
Indeed, I say “may” only because the fact that an act generates illicit satisfactions may render it 
morally impermissible only if those satisfactions critically affected its attractiveness to its 
perpetrator.40
 Economists are wont to make two arguments against the conclusion that tort decisions 
that impose costs on actors whose choices give them illicit pleasures (in my terms but not theirs, 
that correctly enforce liberal norms in illicit-pleasure tort-cases) may be allocatively inefficient.41  
 
 
Possibility of a Fair Paretian, 110 YALE L.J. 251 (2000) and A Liberal Theory of Social Welfare: Fairness, Utility, 
and the Pareto Principle, 110 YALE L.J. 22 (2000). 
40 In our society, people who consider themselves to be “liberal” in the sense in which I am using this term 
take at least three different positions on the moral significance of the fact that the perpetrator of an act had an illicit 
motive for committing it.  First, some argue that an individual’s motivation for committing an act is irrelevant to its 
permissibility.  I think this position is clearly wrong.  The liberal duty of appropriate, equal respect and concern 
seems to me to imply that the fact that an act manifested its perpetrator’s disrespect and lack of concern for one or 
more others is highly relevant to its moral permissibility.  Thus, the fact that an executive in a large company chose 
not to promote a Black employee because he was prejudiced against Blacks strikes me as highly relevant to whether 
his decision violates the rejected candidate’s moral rights (say, in a case in which the Black candidate was equally-
qualified but not more qualified than the successful non-Black candidate and could have made no justified moral 
objection if a random-choice procedure resulted in the white candidate’s selection).  (A related issue of 
contemporary interest is whether a crime is made worse if it is motivated by hate.)  Second, some individuals who 
consider themselves to be liberal in my sense argue that the fact that an individual’s commission of an act was 
motivated by its satisfying his illicit desires renders it morally impermissible only if he would not have found it 
attractive on balance (henceforth “profitable”) but for its satisfying some of his illicit desires.  Third, some liberals 
would argue that the basic liberal principle of appropriate, equal respect and concern implies that any act is rendered 
morally impermissible by its satisfying the actor’s illicit desires (A) at all, (B) to a significant extent, or (C) 
sufficiently to make it “profitable” to him on that account alone even though this consequence was not necessary for 
its being “profitable” for him.  (In the United States, Constitutional Law experts disagree about a related issue—viz., 
whether an analog of the second or an analog of some variant of the third position just described should be the test 
for whether the fact that some of those who made a State decision had an illicit motive for doing so renders it 
unconstitutional.  The analog to the second position would be that the unconstitutional motivation [say] of some 
legislators render a statute they passed unconstitutional only if it was essential to the passage of the legislation in 
question.  The analog to the third test would be that a statute is rendered unconstitutional by the illicit motivation of 
[some of] the legislators who supported it only if a significant number of the legislative supporters of the legislation 
were significantly unconstitutionally motivated to support it, only if a significant number though not necessarily a 
critical number of its supporters would have rejected it but for their unconstitutional motivations, or only if the 
relevant unconstitutional motivations were a sufficient condition for its passage.  My own position on this moral-
rights issue [and on the Constitutional-law issue discussed in this parenthetical] is the second position delineated 
above.) 
41 Economists are not inclined to make a third argument that favors their conclusion—viz., the argument that 
such legal decisions encourage such rights-violations not only by increasing the “profitability” of rights-violating 





                                                                                                                                                            
First, they point out correctly that moral-rights-violating behavior that would be allocatively 
efficient if it affected no-one else’s choices generate allocative costs by making it “profitable” 
for its perpetrator’s potential victims to make allocatively-costly avoidance-moves.  Although 
this consequence is obviously relevant to the actual allocative efficiency of the relevant moral-
rights-violating conduct and hence to the allocative inefficiency of decisions to make the relevant 
moral-rights violators civilly liable, there would be no reason to believe that it would always be 
critical even if this effect of such a decision were not at least somewhat offset by the tendency of 
decisions to impose civil liability on such violators to increase their incentive to escape detection 
and hence the allocative costs they generate when attempting to escape detection. 
 Second, economists argue that decisions to hold moral-rights violators liable in these 
cases will tend to be allocatively efficient because they will induce the perpetrators to purchase 
as opposed to taking what they want—i.e., because they will tend to induce the perpetrators to 
engage in voluntary market transactions.  According to this argument, this tendency promotes 
allocative efficiency because it puts to a market test the perpetrator’s claim that the equivalent-
dollar value to him of “what he took” is higher than the equivalent-dollar cost to his victim of 
“his taking what he took.”  Although there is something to this argument, for two reasons, it does 
not demonstrate the universal, greater allocative efficiency of market transactions or legal rules 
that encourage them.  The first such reason is less interesting and may be less important: the 
argument ignores the allocative mechanical transaction cost of voluntary market transactions.  
Even if, allocative transaction costs aside, voluntary market transactions tend to be more 
allocatively efficient than involuntary transfers, at least in some identifiable sets of cases, the 
differences in question may be smaller than the allocative-transaction-cost savings the 
involuntary transfers permit. 
 The second reason is more interesting and may be critical in those instances in which it is 
relevant: the allocative-efficiency argument for inducing individuals to purchase what they want 
in a voluntary market transaction rather than to take it ignores the fact that the acts of purchasing 
 
cost” of engaging in it but also by encouraging people to develop such preferences in the first place (or, perhaps 
more accurately, by deterring them from combating the development of such preferences) not just by increasing the 
profitability of satisfying them but by “expressing” a tolerance for them.  I suspect that economists’ failure to make 
this argument (indeed, their general reluctance to admit the “expressive” function of law) reflects their tendency to 





and selling some “things” in a voluntary market transaction sometimes change what is 
“transferred” from both the original possessor’s and the later possessor’s points of view in ways 
that affect the equivalent-dollar value the later possessor obtains and the equivalent-dollar cost 
the original possessor incurs and derivatively affects the allocative efficiency of “the transfer” in 
question.  Thus, one cannot buy friendship, and paid-for sex is not the same thing as rape or 
voluntary, unpaid-for sex from either participant’s perspective.  Because a rapist may place a 
higher equivalent-dollar value on rape than on purchased sex if he views the rape as more 
controlling of or more degrading to his victims and because a woman may find it more degrading 
or self-definitionally costly to sell sexual services than to be the (involuntary) victim of a rape, 
the fact that the highest price that a rapist would have been willing to pay his victim for her 
sexual services in a voluntary market transaction is lower than the lowest price his victim would 
have been willing to accept in a voluntary market transaction in exchange for her sexual services 
is perfectly compatible with the rape’s having been allocatively efficient—i.e., with the 
conclusion that the equivalent-dollar gain the rapist obtained from his act exceeds the equivalent-
dollar loss it imposed on his victim.  If so, a legal rule that prevented rapes in the relevant set of 
circumstances would generate some allocative inefficiency.  Indeed, the legal rule in question 
would even generate some allocative inefficiency if it induced a sale of the sexual service if the 
difference between the equivalent-dollar value and cost of the sold service were lower than its 
counterpart for the rape. 
 In short, neither of the arguments that economists make against the conclusion that it will 
sometimes be allocatively inefficient to make privacy-invaders, batterers, rapists, or false 
imprisoners who take illicit pleasure from their acts civilly or criminally liable carries the day.  
Hence, in some privacy, battery, rape, and false imprisonment cases, it will be allocatively 






D. The Fact That the Value or Moral Significance That Liberals Assign to the Loss That 
Victims of Privacy-Invasions, Batteries, Rapes, and False Imprisonments Sustain Differs 
From the Value That Would Be Assigned to Those Losses in an Allocative-Efficiency 
Analysis 
 
 This point is exactly parallel to its predecessor.  In this case, the critical point is that, even 
if the allocative-efficiency analysis takes account of the net equivalent-dollar loss the relevant 
injurious act imposes on non-traditional victims whose value-commitments (presumably) lead 
them to disvalue the traditional victims’ suffering such losses as well as the number of dollars the 
traditional victims would have to lose in an inherently-neutral way to be left in a position that 
those victims would regard as equivalent to the position in which the injurious act would leave 
them, the effect of such losses on allocative efficiency (the negative equivalent-dollar effect of 
such losses) would not be the same as the liberal “cost” of such losses.  As I have already 
indicated, at least in part, this difference reflects the fact that liberals are not bound by the 
evaluations that the actual victims and disapproving “observers” give to such losses, and in part 
it reflects the fact that liberals use a different “currency” to value such losses—value them not in 
terms of their direct and indirect equivalent-dollar effects but in terms of the disrespect they 
manifest for the victims in question and usually for all members of the society in question as well 
as of their direct and indirect effects on both the direct victims’ and others’ having and taking 
advantage of the opportunity to lead lives of moral integrity.  I should add that this analysis will 
apply regardless of whether one is focusing on the consequences of the injurious act or the 
consequences of the State’s finding that act wrongful and requiring its perpetrator to compensate 






E. The Reality That Some Accident-Participants Who Have Done Appropriate Research 
Into the Avoidance-Moves That Are Available to Them and the Net Effect of These 
Choices on Either Allocative Efficiency or the Opportunities That Their Society’s 
Members and Participants Have to Lead Lives of Moral Integrity May Misestimate Those 
Options’ Consequences in Ways That Lead Them to Reach the Mistaken but Self-
Justifying Conclusion That They Are Morally Obligated to Make a Particular Avoidance-
Move That Is Available to Them (That Lead Them to Reach the Otherwise-Mistaken 
Conclusion That, in Effect, They Are Morally Obligated to Execute the Move in 
Question) 
 
 The fourth “reason” why the common law of torts of a liberal, rights-based State of 
perfect moral integrity would not maximize allocative efficiency is rather complicated.  This 
argument proceeds in three stages.  The first establishes that even tort cogenerators who have 
fulfilled their duty to do research into the identity and relevant consequences of their various 
available avoidance-options will sometimes misestimate the consequences of making one or 
more of the avoidance-moves they currently believe they could make in ways that lead them to 
make the self-justifying mistake of concluding that they are morally obligated to make the 
move(s) in question.  This mistake is self-justifying because, once the chooser has concluded 
mistakenly that he was morally obligated to make a particular avoidance-move that was available 
to him, this mistaken conclusion renders his rejection of the move in question wrongful.  
Admittedly, the avoidance-move the mistaken injurer failed to make would not have been 
allocatively efficient (in cases in which the relevant possible loss was a mere-utility loss) or 
would not have increased the on-balance opportunity of relevant individuals to lead lives of 
moral integrity (in cases in which the relevant possible loss was a loss that could have reduced 
such opportunities).  However, that fact is consistent with the relevant choice’s inflicting a mere-
utility loss on some individuals or depriving some individuals of the opportunity to lead a life of 
moral integrity—i.e., with the relevant choice’s having wrongfully inflicted a recoverable loss on 
some moral-rights holders.  (This conclusion has no counterpart in the situation in which the 
injurer believed ex ante that he had an avoidance-move option [that he was obligated to make use 
of] that he did not in fact have since, in such a situation, his wrongful rejection of this non-
existent option could not harm anyone.)  Unless the fact that the wrongful rejection of the 
avoidance-move in question did not generate a net loss of the relevant kind (conferred net 
benefits of the relevant kind on others [including possibly the injurer]) that were at least as big as 





would be entitled to recover the loss he suffered because his mistaken injurer wrongfully rejected 
an avoidance-move that was available to him.  I can think of no such reason, though the tort-law 
rule that victims who have suffered a mere pecuniary loss are not entitled to recovery gives me 
some pause on this account (since the distinguishing feature of at least some pecuniary-loss cases 
[e.g., cases in which the plaintiff is a restaurant-owner whose place of business is located next to 
a formerly-pleasant river rendered foul by culpably-caused pollution] is that, from an allocative-
efficiency perspective, most of the victim’s losses are “offset” by gains to his rivals [other 
restaurant-owners who make sales to the customers who no longer frequent the riverside 
establishment]). 
 The second stage of the relevant argument focuses on the allocative inefficiency of the 
avoidance-move the potential injurer mistakenly but self-justifyingly believes he was morally 
obligated to make.  When the loss the potential injurer believed he might generate was a mere-
utility loss and he should have expected ex ante that his act or activity would impose net 
equivalent-dollar accident-or-pollution losses on others if he did not avoid, his obligation was to 
make allocatively-efficient avoidance-decisions, and the move he mistakenly concluded he was 
obligated to make must have been allocatively inefficient.  When the loss the potential injurer 
believed he might generate was an on-balance reduction in the opportunity that relevant 
individuals had to lead a life of moral integrity, the move he mistakenly but self-justifyingly 
believed he was morally obligated to make may or may not have been allocatively inefficient, 
but clearly some of the moves in question will have been allocatively inefficient. 
 The third stage of the relevant argument explains why it will be allocatively inefficient 
for the courts to enforce the rights of such victims.  The best explanation I can provide is that 
doing so will be allocative-transaction-costly, will tend to decrease the allocative efficiency of 
potential-victim avoidance-decisions, and will have an ambiguous effect on the allocative 
efficiency of potential-injurer avoidance-decisions.  Decisions to enforce victims’ rights in these 
cases will probably increase transaction costs by leading victims to bring suits they would not 
otherwise have brought and by causing the court in question and future courts to investigate the 
relevant mistake-issue in any such cases that are brought (even though such decisions may also 
tend to reduce the allocative transaction costs and public-finance-connected non-transaction-cost 





                                                
tort awards).  Moreover, even in our highly-Pareto-imperfect world, a decision to enforce the 
victim’s rights will tend to decrease the allocative efficiency of potential-victim avoidance-
decisions by reducing the incentive of victims to make presumptively-allocative-efficient 
avoidance-decisions whose rejection will not be deemed contributorily negligent either because 
the move in question is a type of move whose rejection is never assessed for contributory 
negligence (or negligence) or because impacted information will cause the trier of fact to make a 
false-negative error on the contributory-negligence issue.  Admittedly, such decisions will have 
an ambiguous effect on the misallocation that potential injurers generate when making 
avoidance-decisions.  In the one direction, to the extent that such a decision will induce potential 
injurers who mistakenly believed that some avoidance-move available to them was allocatively 
efficient to make the move in question, it will tend to decrease allocative efficiency on that 
account.  In the other direction, to the extent that such a decision will induce potential injurers to 
make avoidance-moves they correctly perceived to be ex ante allocatively efficient by 
establishing that they will be liable for the losses their rejection of these moves generate even if 
their perception turns out to have been wrong, it will tend to increase allocative-efficiency on this 
account (particularly in our highly-Pareto-imperfect world in which the relevant imperfections 
already deflate potential-injurer avoidance-incentives on balance42).  If, as I suspect, these two 
effects on the allocative efficiency of potential-injurer avoidance-decisions are pretty much a 
wash, decisions by courts to enforce the rights of victims in these mistake cases will be 
allocatively inefficient on balance. 
 
F. The Reality That Some Accident-Participants Who Have Correctly Identified the 
Avoidance-Moves Available to Them and Correctly Estimated Their Net Effect on the 
Extent to Which the Relevant Society’s Members Take Their Lives Morally Seriously or 
on Allocative Efficiency May Still Incorrectly Conclude That They Are Morally 
Obligated to Make a Particular Avoidance-Move Because They Have Made One or More 
Mathematical Errors 
 
 This argument is perfectly analogous to the argument of the preceding subsection. 
 
 
42 For an explanation, see Richard S. Markovits, The Allocative Efficiency of Shifting From a “Negligence” 
System to a “Strict-Liability” Regime in Our Highly-Pareto-Imperfect Economy: A Partial and Preliminary Third-





                                                
G. The Possibility That Adjudicators in a Liberal, Rights-Based State That Fulfills All Its 
Moral Obligations at the Time of Decision May Have Made Internally-Incorrect, 
Allocatively-Inefficient Decisions in the Past That Have Legitimate, Critical Precedential 
Weight 
 
 Even if one assumes (contrary to fact) that, in cases of first impression, the internally-
correct answer to all accident-law issues would be allocatively efficient, the internally-correct 
answer to some of those legal issues in later cases may be allocatively inefficient if those issues 
were internally-incorrectly resolved in an allocatively-inefficient way in earlier cases and 
decisions to correct the earlier errors would wrong parties who reasonably relied on the 
precedents in question.  This conclusion reflects the fact that the moral significance that 
liberalism attributes to such precedents may be different from the impact of their existence on the 
allocative efficiency of following them.43
 
H. The Possibility That Pareto Imperfections May Create Situations in Which the 
Compensatory Damages That Corrective-Justice Requires Will Not Induce the Relevant 
Actors to Make Allocatively-Efficient Avoidance-Moves 
 
 As I have explained elsewhere in great detail,44
(1) imperfections in seller and buyer competition, externalities that will not be 
internalized by the tort-law decision in question, taxes on the margin of income, 
actor non-sovereignty and non-maximization, and buyer surplus can all distort the 
private profitability of avoidance-moves both individually and collectively, 
 
(2) potential-avoider non-sovereignty and non-maximization can both individually 
and collectively cause potential avoiders to make unprofitable decisions to reject 
profitable avoidance-moves or to make unprofitable avoidance-moves, and as a 
result 
 
(3) potential avoiders may not make allocatively-efficient avoidance-decisions even if 
the law will make them compensate their conventional tort-loss co-generators for 
the losses their allocatively-inefficient avoidance-move rejections impose on 
them—i.e., there is no reason to believe that the net distortion in the private 
profitability of avoidance that Pareto imperfections would generate and the errors 
 
43 For a detailed analysis of the factors that affect the appropriate weight for a liberal, rights-based society to 
give to precedent if it adopts a system in which previous legal decisions may affect the legal rights of parties to legal 
disputes, see Markovits, op. cit. supra note 33 at 72-74. 
44 See Markovits, op. cit. supra note 42 at 46-50 and 74-48 (1998) and Richard S. Markovits, Monopoly and 
the Allocative Inefficiency of First-Best-Economically-Efficient Tort-law: The Whys and Some Therefores, 46 CASE 





                                                
that potential avoiders would commit when making their avoidance-decisions 
would in the relevant sense cancel each other out. 
 
Since adjudicators in common-law tort cases in liberal, rights-based societies are obligated to set 
damages at a level equal to the loss the victims suffered,45 it would be internally incorrect for 
them to adjust their damage-award in a given case to the level that would be required to induce 
(say) the injurer to make allocatively-efficient avoidance-decisions.  Indeed, even if the damage-
awards required by liberal corrective justice include compensation for the transaction costs an 
entitled victim reasonably incurred to pursue his claim and even if potential victims of a culpable 
non-avoider are entitled to receive compensation for the risk costs their injurer’s non-avoidance 
imposed on them, the internally-correct damage-award in a common-law tort case in a liberal, 
rights-based society may be allocatively inefficient. 
 The following two numerical examples illustrate this possibility.  The first illustrates the 
problems that Pareto imperfections beyond the control of the tort-case adjudicator can cause by 
distorting the profitability of avoidance even if the relevant potential avoider is a sovereign 
maximizer.  Assume the following facts: 
(1) the private cost of the rejected allocatively-efficient avoidance move to the injurer 
was $105; 
 
(2) those private costs were undistorted—i.e., the allocative cost of the relevant 
avoidance-move was also $105; 
 
(3) both the potential victims and the potential injurer are indifferent to risk; 
 
(4) the rejected allocatively-efficient avoidance-move would have reduced from 20% 
to 10% the probability of the victim’s suffering a $1,000 loss—i.e., would have 
reduced the potential victim’s weighted-average-expected loss by $100; 
 
(5) the victim would not have had to incur any private transaction costs to collect his 
claim if his injurer would be found liable, and the processing of any loss-related 
legal claims (and insurance and government-transfer claims) would generate no 
allocative transaction costs; 
 
45 I ignore punitive damages, whose award in any event would not be guided by the goal of maximizing 
allocative efficiency.  I should add that I suspect that the award of punitive damages may be illegitimate in common-
law tort cases in a liberal, rights-based society—at least to the extent that such damages do not constitute 
compensation for the extra harm the victim suffered because of the particularly-insulting character of the choice that 
made the injurer liable.  This conclusion is compatible with the legitimacy of a liberal State’s imposing civil fines or 





                                                
 
(6) the $1,000 loss the injurer’s avoidance-move might have prevented would have 
consisted solely of lost wages that the avoidance would have prevented by 
preventing the temporary disablement of the victim in question; 
 
(7) because the potential victim’s labor increased the unit output of an imperfect 
competitor who did not engage in price discrimination and whose valuation of the 
victim’s labor-product was not distorted by any other Pareto imperfection, the 
allocative benefits that the avoidance would have generated if it prevented the 
potential victim’s disablement (the allocative value of his output if [as I will 
assume] he was indifferent between working in an uninjured state and consuming 
leisure while temporarily disabled) would have been $1200;46 and 
 
(8) the potential avoiders (injurers) whose avoidance-choices will be affected by the 
legal ruling in question will be large, sophisticated companies that either will 
know or should know that the allocative value of their potential victims’ labor 
will be higher than the victims’ wages—more particularly, that the allocative 
benefits of avoidance will be $120=(10% of $1200) rather than $100=(10% of 
$1,000)—and that the avoidance-move in question will therefore be allocatively 
efficient. 
 
 Now assume that the adjudicator knows all these facts, concludes on this basis that the 
injurer’s avoidance-move rejection was wrongful, and therefore holds the injurer liable.  In this 
type of case, corrective justice would require that the injurer fully compensate the victim for his 
loss—i.e., pay the victim $1,000.  But if the injurer did not have to incur any private transaction 
costs to settle or litigate the victim’s claim or to pay these damages (and possibly even if he did), 
the prospect of these damages’ being awarded would not induce him or his future counterparts to 
make the allocatively-efficient avoidance-move in question since the private cost to him (and 
them) of rejecting that move (the weighted-average-expected amount of damages the rejection 
would cause him to pay—10% of $1,000=$100) would be lower than the private cost to him of 
making the move ($105). 
 The second example illustrates the relevance of the potential avoider’s non-sovereignty 
and non-maximization in an otherwise-Pareto-perfect world.  This example maintains all the 
assumptions of its predecessor except that it assumes that the private benefits of avoidance were 
 
46 Roughly speaking, ceteris paribus, the allocative value of the unit output produced by a laborer who works 
for a non-discriminating imperfect competitor will be higher than the value of his output to his employer (and hence 
the wage the worker receives) because the allocative value of his output equals the price for which it will be sold 





not distorted and that the private cost of avoidance was $95.  In this case, the avoidance-move 
would have increased allocative efficiency by $5, the potential injurer in question would be 
culpable and therefore be found liable for rejecting it, and the avoidance-move in question would 
therefore be profitable for him to make.  But now assume that—despite that fact—the relevant 
potential injurer would not make the move in question because he would underestimate the 
relevant private and allocative benefits, overestimate the relevant private and allocative costs, or 
simply not pay attention.  In such a situation, allocative efficiency might be increased by a rule 
that awarded victims supra-compensatory damages—i.e., the allocative-efficiency gains such a 
rule would generate by inducing potential injurers to avoid by causing them to pay more 
attention, to make more accurate estimates of the relevant costs and benefits, or to do their maths 
correctly might exceed the allocative-efficiency losses the rule might generate by inducing 
victims to reduce allocative efficiency by putting themselves in harm’s way by making 
allocatively-inefficient choices that will not in practice be found contributorily negligent and by 
inducing potential injurers who fear that they may be incorrectly found to have been negligent to 
overavoid from the perspective of allocative efficiency.  However, even if this is the case, it 
would be internally-incorrect for adjudicators in common-law tort cases in a liberal, rights-based 
State to award entitled tort-victims supra-compensatory damages. 
 
I. The Possibility That No Damage Award a Court Could Make Would Minimize the 
Amount of Misallocation Caused by the Type of Contingency With Which a Given Tort 
Case Was Concerned 
 
 So far I have assumed that, if the liberal conception of corrective justice required a 
common-law court in a liberal, rights-based society to award the plaintiff in a common-law tort 
suit the damages that would minimize tort-contingency-related misallocation, a perfectly-
informed trier-of-fact and court would be able to do so.  This section points out that, in many 
situations, even if the court makes the damage-award that is the most-allocatively-efficient award 
it could make, its decision would not constitute the most-allocatively-efficient response the State 
could make to the relevant tort contingency for reasons unrelated to the allocative-transaction-
costliness of adjudicative proceedings. 





                                                
(1)  in general, in order for a public decisionmaker to be able to induce X types of 
decisions to be made allocatively efficiently, he must have X policy-instruments 
at his disposal and 
 
(2) when the allocatively-efficient response for private actors to make to a tort 
contingency includes fixed-cost as well as variable-cost decisions, common-law 
courts will not have enough policy-instruments to induce all the relevant types of 
decisions to be made in an allocatively-efficient way. 
 
For example, when the allocatively-efficient response to a possible-rescue contingency involves 
the execution of allocatively-efficient rescue-operation investments as well as the execution of 
rescue-attempts that are allocatively efficient, given the investments that have been made, the 
most-allocatively-efficient award that courts could offer a successful rescuer might not minimize 
the total allocative cost the relevant contingency generates because the award that would 
eliminate rescue-attempt, rescue-attempt-offer acceptance/rejection, and potential-rescuee-
avoidance misallocation might cause rescue-operation-investment misallocation and vice versa—
i.e., because the most-allocatively-efficient response to the relevant contingency would require 
an appropriate set of investment-subsidies to be combined with an appropriate set of damage-
awards.47` 
 I should not close this section without admitting that this possibility may not belong in 
Part 2’s list since it does not suggest a reason why a common law court should not make the 
most-allocatively-efficient decisions it could make—i.e., because it indicates only that in some 
circumstances that decision will not be so allocatively efficient as a more complicated policy-
package to which it might belong. 
* * * 
 I have placed asterisks at the end of the preceding paragraph because the next three 
reasons why the common law of torts of a liberal, rights-based society may not be allocatively 
efficient are connected to what I will refer to as our society’s binary conception of corrective-
justice rights.  According to this “binary” conception of corrective-justice rights, in order to 
demonstrate that he has a corrective-justice right to compensation from someone he alleges has 
 
47 For a detailed theoretical analysis of this kind of possibility, see Richard S. Markovits, Marine-Salvage 
Law and Marine-Peril-Related Policy: A Second-best and Third-Best Economic-Efficiency Analysis of the Problem, 





                                                
wrongfully and tortiously harmed him, a victim must establish that more probably than not the 
defendant made a wrongful choice that violated his duty to the victim and that was a but-for 
cause of the victim’s loss.48  This conception of corrective-justice rights is “binary” because, 
under it, a “defendant” who may have been a wrongful but-for cause of a loss is liable for the full 
loss if it is found that, more probably than not, he made a wrongful choice that was a but-for 
cause of the loss’ occurrence (regardless of the fact that the probability that he made a wrongful 
choice that was a but-for cause of the loss was under 100%) and is liable for none of the loss if 
the probability of his having been a wrongful but-for cause of the loss was not higher than 50% 
(despite the fact that the probability that he had made a wrongful choice that was a but-for cause 
of the loss was higher than 0%). 
 This conception of corrective-justice-right claims has two critical elements.  The first is 
the “but-for cause” element of moral causation, which I perceive to be an ineliminable feature of 
any conception of corrective-justice-right claims—i.e., not to be particularly connected to either 
liberalism or the binary conception of corrective justice.  The second element of the binary 
conception of corrective-justice-right claims is its more-probable-than not element, which is its 
defining component and determines the loss-division it sanctions in all cases in which the loss 
has not been but-for caused more probably than not by the wrongful conduct of both the putative 
injurer and the victim.  Although I do not find this defining feature of the binary conception of 
corrective justice inconsistent with liberal principles of justice, I also do not think that it is 
entailed by liberalism.  Loss-division protocols under which the division of the loss varies more 
continuously with probabilities of wrongful but-for causation would seem to me to be equally 
compatible with liberal concerns that possible wrongful injurers  be treated in a way that 
encourages them to consider themselves to be the authors of their own lives and that possibly-
wronged victims be treated with the respect that is their due. 
 
48 I realize that the common law of the United States may not have adopted this rule of liability even in 
negligence cases—in particular, may require that the victim show only that (1) more probably than not, the 
defendant caused the loss.  To see why this requirement differs from the corrective-justice requirement I have 
articulated, assume that (1) the probability that the defendant behaved wrongfully is 70% and (2) the probability that 
the defendant’s wrongful conduct would have caused the loss had eh engaged in it is 50%.  On these fact, the 
defendant would be liable under American law as described even though the probability that he wrongfully caused 
the loss—(70%)(60%)=42%—was not higher than 50% (was not sufficiently high for the plaintiff to have 





 In any event, the first two of the next three reasons why the common law of torts of a 
liberal, rights-based society may not be allocatively efficient relate to the “but-for causation” 
conception of moral responsibility that I do think is primitively correct and therefore not 
specially connected to liberalism, and the last of these three reasons is at least somewhat 
connected to the binary character of our society’s conception of corrective-justice rights, which I 
believe is consistent with though not required by liberal commitments. 
 
J. Simultaneous-Independent-Causation Cases and the “But-For Causation” Element of 
Corrective-Justice-Right Claims 
 
 Assume that (1) the independent choices of two or more actors belonged to two or more 
different sets of sufficient conditions for the generation of some loss, (2) each such choice would 
be allocatively inefficient if none of the other choices were made, (3) all such choices combined 
were allocatively inefficient, (4) the relevant sets of sufficient conditions were fulfilled at times 
that resulted in two or more such sets’ “causing” the loss to occur simultaneously, and (perhaps 
redundantly) (5) the loss was not increased by the fulfillment of more than one set of the relevant 
sets of sufficient conditions.  In situations of this kind, it would be allocatively efficient to 
prevent the relevant choices from being made.  However, for two reasons, no court may be 
authorized to resolve a common-law (corrective-justice-based) tort suit in such a situation in the 
way that would be allocatively efficient.  First, in this type of situation, the corrective-justice-
based common law of torts may not be able to secure allocative efficiency by holding all the 
relevant choosers liable because no individual chooser was a but-for cause of the loss that 
resulted.  (I will refer to choosers in this situation as “putative injurers” because no such choosers 
are “but-for causes” of the loss.) 
 Second, in at least some of these situations, a common-law court may not be authorized 
to reach the allocatively-efficient conclusion because none of the putative injurers may have 
behaved wrongfully.  At least, this conclusion is warranted when (1) the individual putative 
injurers’ failures to avoid were independent—when each believed that the others would fail to 
avoid regardless of what he did, (2) each individual putative injurer knew that one or more others 
was sufficiently likely not to avoid for his avoidance-move rejection not to be allocatively 





                                                
attractiveness of not avoiding to each putative injurer was not critically affected by his desire to 
have the loss generated.49
 An ingenious argument made by my colleague David Robertson requires me to qualify 
the preceding two paragraphs.  Robertson suggests that, at least when there are just two putative 
injurers whose choices are members of one or more sets of sufficient causes of a loss whose 
fulfillment will “cause” that loss simultaneously and neither avoids, each is a wrongful cause of 
the loss because each has either caused the physical loss wrongfully or tortiously impaired the 
victim’s cause of action against the other.50  Robertson is bothered by the fact that the 
“impairment loss” is a pure economic loss.  However, that American-positive-law concern is not 
germane to my argument: although in some cases there may be sound grounds for holding pure 
economic losses not to be actionable, doing so cannot be justified in the kind of situation with 
which this section is concerned.  Admittedly, Robertson’s argument would have the consequence 
of causing a second potential avoider to engage in socially pointless, presumably costly 
avoidance once a first potential avoider had mistakenly failed to avoid.  But this possibility 
would be practically important only if the first potential avoider made a mistake since 
Robertson’s argument would make it profitable for the first potential avoider to avoid—at least if 
it were conjoined with an appropriate set of damage-assignment rules. 
 In any event, standard textbook examples of this type of situation include cases in which 
a house is simultaneously consumed by two or more fires each of which was caused wrongfully, 
 
49 Each such choice would clearly be wrongful if all such choices were interdependent in the sense that none 
would be made if we were not made since in such a situation each of the relevant choices would be a but-for cause 
of the loss’ occurring.  At least, this conclusion would be warranted if, as I suppose, such chooses could not absolve 
themselves by arguing that they were not responsible for though he caused the choices of other because these 
choices were made by autonomous choosers. 
 I also am confident that the individual choices in question are wrongful when each individual chooser 
believes that his choice will be a but-for cause of the loss—does not know ex ante that the loss would be caused in 
any case by the satisfaction of one or more other sets of conditions to which his choice does not belong (one or more 
other sets that may or may not include human choices). 
 I admit, however, that in this situation the wrongfulness of the relevant choices is more problematic when 
each individual chooser did not know and should not have known that his choice would affect the outcome—i.e., did 
the research he was obligated to do and concluded, reasonably that the loss would occur regardless of what he did 
because Mother Nature either on its own or in combination with choices of others would cause exactly the same loss 
to occur at exactly the same time.  I am inclined to say that some choices made in this situation are wrongful because 
they manifest the chooser’s desire for the loss to be inflicted—i.e., because they manifest the chooser’s wrongful 
disposition.  Of course, this characterization will be justified only if the choice in question would not have been 





                                                                                                                                                            
cases in which an individual is simultaneously killed by two or more bullets that were 
wrongfully shot, and cases in which a pollution-loss was simultaneously caused by two or more 
sets of pollutants that were wrongfully discharged by different polluters in circumstances in 
which the second through nth set of pollutants did not affect the resulting loss.51  I suspect that 
such simultaneous-causation cases occur very rarely, though the importance of possible cases of 
this kind is undoubtedly enhanced by the inability of relevant victims to prove that, more 
probably than not, one such set of sufficient causes “first caused” the loss. 
 
K. “Overdetermined” Step-Function-Loss Cases and the “But-For Causation” Element of 
Corrective-Justice-Right Claims 
 
 Assume that the function that relates the loss that will result from varying amounts of 
pollution’s being put into some medium is a “step function”—i.e., would be represented in a 
two-dimensional diagram in which the loss was measured along the vertical axes and the 
pollution along the horizontal axis as a series of disconnected horizontal lines that could be 
connected by verticals at their successive end and beginning points.  Environmental specialists 
indicate that this type of loss function is not uncommon.52  Thus, it is said that in the river-
pollution context, below some level of pollution, no harm results; suddenly, at a particular level, 
one cannot swim in or fall into the river without incurring some health risk; over some range 
above that level, additional pollution does not change the resulting loss; and then suddenly at 
some higher level of pollution, the fish are no longer edible; again, over some range above this 
latter level, additional pollution does not change the environmental loss; and then suddenly when 
pollution increases above some level, the fish die and the river smells.  Assume in addition that 
(1) each of 30 polluters put two units of pollution into some body of water without influencing 
his fellow polluters’ decisions to pollute, (2) no loss would be generated by the presence of zero 
to 49.99 units of pollution, (3) $100 in mere-utility losses would be generated by the presence of 
50 to 120 units of pollution, and (4) the cost to each polluter of eliminating part or all of his 
 
50 See David W. Robertson, The Common Sense of Cause in Fact, 75 TEX. L. REV. 1765, 1787-89, 1789-99 & 
n. 107 (1997). 
51 In most such pollution cases, the choices of the individual polluters will not be wrongful for the reason 
indicated at the end of note 48—viz., because, in most such cases, the decision to pollute would be profitable even 





                                                                                                                                                            
pollution was $4.  Although on these assumptions it would be allocatively efficient for 6 
polluters to eliminate their pollution in the situation in question (although their reducing the total 
amount of pollutants in the water from 60 units to 48 units would increase allocative efficiency 
by $100-6[$4]=$76), the common law could not secure this result by making the polluters liable 
to their victims because, for two reasons, no victim would have a corrective-justice claim against 
any individual polluter: (1) because no polluter was a but-for cause of the loss in question 
(because no individual polluter’s pollution affected the loss either directly or by influencing 
other polluters’ pollution-decisions since each’s pollution raised total pollution from 58 to 60 
units) and (2) because, on the above account no individual polluter behaved wrongfully by 
polluting (since each’s pollution was allocatively efficient—saved him $4 in abatement costs and 
caused no damage). 
 
L. Imperfections in the Information Available to the Trier-of-Fact on the “More Probable 
Than Not” Element of the Operative Conception of Corrective-Justice-Right Claims 
 
 I have already referred to one kind of causation-information whose imperfect availability 
can render allocatively inefficient the internally-correct resolution of a common-law tort case in 
a liberal, rights-based State—information on whether a possible simultaneous-independent-
causation case is an actual simultaneous-independent-causation case and, if not, on the identity 
of the “first causer” of the loss in question.  If the trier-of-fact cannot determine that there was a 
“first causer” and/or the identity of the “first cause,” the common-law court will not be 
authorized to hold any putative injurer liable even if one of them was a “first causer” and it 
would be allocatively efficient for all of them to avoid.  By way of contrast, if the trier-of-fact 
could determine that there was a “first causer” and could identity not only him but also the 
“second through nth causers,” it would be authorized to hold all of them liable if each’s failure to 
avoid were wrongful because each would have been a but-for cause of part of the loss that 
resulted.  In fact, at least if each potential injurer should assume that the others would act as 
sovereign maximizers if he avoided, the decision of the first potential injurer not to avoid would 
be wrongful since, regardless of where he is placed in the time-ordering, the loss would not occur 
 
52 See, e.g., BRUCE A. ACKERMAN, DALE W. HENDERSON, SUSAN ROSE-ACKERMAN, AND JAMES SAWYER, 





if he avoided and ex hypothesis the prevention of the loss’ occurring at any time was allocatively 
efficient.  I should add that in this situation there would also be no loss-division-injustice 
problem: all the loss would be and should be allocated to the actor whose failure to avoid was a 
but-for cause of its generation (i.e., to the initial non-avoider). 
 The second type of causation-information whose imperfect availability can make the 
resolution of a common-law tort case that is correct as a matter of law allocatively inefficient 
also relates to the identity of the putative injurer who was the but-for cause of the loss.  Assume 
that in a non-simultaneous-causation case the party who has suffered a loss (1) can demonstrate 
that two or more actors who had a relevant duty toward them made duty-violating, allocatively-
inefficient choices that more probably than not caused some individuals to suffer the kind of loss 
the victim in question suffered but (2) cannot prove that, more probably than not, any particular 
injurer had caused his loss.  In some cases of this kind (e.g., when the loss was asbestositis that 
was caused by the inhalation of one unit of asbestos and asbestos was wrongfully put into the air 
that the victim breathed by two or more polluters, none of whom was more likely than not the 
source of the asbestos the victim inhaled), at no point in time would it have been possible to 
identify the particular wrongdoer who harmed the victim.  In other cases of this kind (e.g., cases 
in which the victim’s illness was caused by his ingestion several years earlier of a medicine that 
was wrongfully produced by two or more pharmaceutical companies none of which was more 
likely than not his ultimate supplier), it would have been possible at an earlier point in time to 
identify the particular manufacturer-wrongdoer who harmed the victim in question (viz., at the 
time at which the prescription-filling record was recoverable) but was no longer possible to do so 
at the time at which the victim’s symptoms appeared, the cause of his illness was identified, or 
the suit was brought.  In both these kinds of case, there are wrongdoers whose allocatively-
inefficient wrongdoing have caused harm and individual victims who have been harmed by the 
allocatively-inefficient wrongdoing of individual wrongdoers, but it is not possible to match any 
individual victim with the particular individual wrongdoer whose wrongdoing harmed him.  In 
this case as well, it would be wrong as a matter of law for a court in a common-law tort suit to 
require injurers to pay the victims compensation that would provide potential injurers with 





                                                
authorized to make only those awards that the relevant society’s corrective-justice commitments 
warrant. 
 However, I do not want to proceed without mentioning another possibility that Part 3 will 
explore in more detail.  In my judgment, even though no corrective-justice-based claim lies in 
this sort of case, I do think that the government of a liberal, rights-based State has an obligation 
to pass legislation that would require such wrongdoing possible injurers to compensate such 
victims of tortious wrongdoing—perhaps by making each such possible injurer liable for the 
share of each such victim’s loss that equals the probability that he caused that loss.  Even if 
courts are not authorized to secure this result by announcing and applying retrospectively and/or 
prospectively something like a market-share-liability approach to these cases,53 the victims in 
question may have a constitutional right that the legislature of their liberal, rights-based State 
give them a statutory right to recover such amounts from the wrongdoers in question and a 
related constitutional right to recover damages from the State if it fails to fulfill this legislative 
duty.  Hence, even if a court was not authorized to resolve a common-law tort suit against such 
wrongdoing possible injurers by requiring them to compensate these victims, it might well be 
authorized—indeed, required—to respond to a joined constitutional claim by victims in this 
category to whom the State had granted no statutory right of recovery to recover their loss from 
the State. 
 The third type of causation-information whose imperfect availability can make the 
resolution of a common-law tort case that is correct as a matter of law allocatively inefficient is 
similar to the second.  Assume that (1) the trier-of-fact knows that a loss might have been caused 
by Mother Nature alone or by a combination of Mother Nature and the choice of a particular 
human being or human organization and that (2) if human choice did play a role in the relevant 
loss’ generation, the choice in question was wrongful and allocatively inefficient.  Assume in 
addition that the trier-of-fact has imperfect information about whether human choice did play a 
role in the generation of the loss in question—indeed, that the only information it has on this 
issue is information about the contribution that the defendant’s activity made to the ex ante 
 
53 For a detailed discussion of the situations of this kind in which courts have and have not adopted this type 
of market-share-liability approach, see DAN B. DOBBS, THE LAW OF TORTS 430-32 (2000).  See also RESTATEMENT 
(THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL HARM (BASIC PRINCIPLES), Tentative Draft No. 2, §280. Market-share 





                                                
probability that the loss would occur.  In an otherwise-Pareto-perfect world, the allocatively-
efficient way for the court to respond to this sort of situation would be to hold the possible 
injurer liable and require him to pay the victim that percentage of the victim’s loss that the 
possible injurer’s activity contributed to the ex ante probability of the loss’ occurring.  However, 
that solution is inconsistent with the binary conception of corrective-justice rights to which we 
seem to be committed and which I think is consistent with if not required by liberal 
commitments.  Under this binary conception, the possible injurer will be liable for the whole loss 
if his activity contributed more than 50% of the ex ante probability of its occurring and liable for 
none of the loss if his activity contributed 50% or less than 50% to the ex ante probability of the 
loss’ occurring.54  In an otherwise-Pareto-perfect world, this binary response will cause 
misallocation in two ways: 
(1) by deterring possible injurers in this position from making allocatively-efficient 
avoidance-moves that would reduce the contribution their activity made to the ex 
ante probability of the loss’ occurring from some higher probability not above 
50% to some lower probability not above 50% and 
 
(2) by inducing possible injurers in this position to make allocatively-inefficient 
avoidance-moves that reduce their activity’s contribution to the ex ante 
probability of the loss’ occurring from some probability above 50% to some 
probability below 50%. 
 
 Some illustrations may be helpful.  I start with the first possible type of misallocation.  
Assume that (1) the loss in question is $100,000, (2) the probability that the loss would have 
incurred if the possible injurer did not avoid was 40%, (3) the probability that the loss would 
have occurred had the defendant shut down his operations was 30%, (4) all relevant parties are 
risk-neutral, and (5) the economy is otherwise-Pareto-perfect.  In this initial situation, the 
defendant will not be liable for any loss that occurred because his activity contributed 
(10%/40%)=25%<50.01% of the ex ante probability of the loss’ occurring—i.e., will have to 
reckon with paying no damages.  Now assume that by spending $1,000 the possible injurer could 
have eliminated his contribution to the ex ante probability of the loss’ occurring.  Since this 
avoidance-move would have reduced the weighted-average-expected loss by 
 
54 The case law and RESTATEMENT discussion of this issue is admittedly confused and confusing.  See 





10%($100,000)=$10,000, it would have increased allocative efficiency by $9,000.  However, 
because the defendant’s failure to make this avoidance-move would not have rendered him liable 
(because—even if it would have been detected—it could not have been shown to have been more 
than 50% likely to have been a but-for cause of the loss), the move would have reduced his 
profits by $1,000. 
 The following example illustrates the second misallocative possibility.  Assume that (1) 
the loss in question is $100,000, (2) the probability that the loss would have occurred if the 
putative injurer had not avoided was 80%, (3) the probability that the loss would have occurred 
had the possible injurer shut down his operation was 30% so that the possible injurer’s activity 
would have contributed (50%/80%)=62.5%>50.01% of the ex ante probability of the loss’ 
occurring if he had not avoided, (4) all relevant parties are risk-neutral, (5) the economy is 
otherwise-Pareto-perfect, and (6) the possible injurer could have made an avoidance-move that 
would have cost him $60,000 and would have reduced the absolute amount by which his activity 
increased the probability of the loss’ occurring from 50% to 30%—i.e., that would have reduced 
the percentage-contribution his activity made to the ex ante probability of the loss’ occurring 
from (50%/80%)=62.5%>50.01% to (30%/60))=50%<50.01%.  On these assumptions, the 
avoidance-move in question would have increased the possible injurer’s profits by $20,000 since 
it would have cost him $60,000 and eliminated his liability, which he would have valued at 
80%($100,000)=$80,000 prior to his making the avoidance-move in question.  Unfortunately, on 
these assumptions, the avoidance-move in question would have reduced allocative efficiency by 
$40,000 since its allocative (as well as its private) cost was $60,000 and its ex ante allocative 
benefits were $20,000 (the product of [the 20% reduction in the probability of the loss it would 
effectuate] and [the loss in question—$100,000]): the associated $60,000 inflation in the 
profitability of the avoidance-move in question equals the amount by which it increased the 
uncompensated loss the potential victims must reckon with bearing (from $0 of $80,000 in 
weighted-average-expected losses to $60,000 of $60,000 in weighted-average-expected losses). 
 As I have already indicated, the court response that would prevent these two types of 
misallocation by eliminating the distortion in avoidance-incentives the current binary approach 
generates in these two types of situations—a rule that would hold the possible injurer liable for 





and thereby equate the amount by which the possible injurer’s avoidance would reduce the 
damages he should expect to have to pay on the weighted average with the amount by which it 
would reduce the weighted-average expected loss—is incompatible with the binary conceptual 
corrective-justice rights with which liberalism seems to be at least compatible. 
 The fifth type of information whose imperfect availability can render the resolution of a 
common-law tort case that is correct as a matter of law allocatively inefficient is information that 
relates to the wrongfulness of an injurer’s and/or victim’s conduct.  I will illustrate this 
possibility with three increasingly-complex examples. 
 The first example assumes that the trier-of-fact knows that (1) the situation in question is 
either an individual-care situation (one in which the most-allocatively-efficient response to the 
accident-or-pollution-loss contingency in question is for either the potential victim or the 
potential injurer to avoid) or a no-care situation (one in which the most-allocatively-efficient 
response to the relevant contingency is for no-one to avoid) and (2) there is a 30% probability 
that the potential injurer could have increased ex ante allocative efficiency while conferring a net 
equivalent-dollar gain on others by avoiding while there is no chance that the victim could have 
increased allocative efficiency by avoiding.  In such a situation, transaction-cost considerations 
aside, it would be ex ante allocatively efficient to find the potential injurer liable since doing so 
would tend to induce his future counterparts to engage in allocatively-efficient avoidance when 
they could do so without deterring his victim’s future counterparts from engaging in allocatively-
efficient avoidance since ex hypothesis they cannot do so.  However, in a common-law case of 
this kind in a liberal, rights-based State, it would not be proper for the trier-of-fact to find the 
injurer liable since the probability that the injurer had behaved wrongfully was not over 50%—
specifically, was only 30%.  In this kind of situation, therefore, the State could not provide 
potential injurers with appropriate avoidance-incentives by “legalizing” their victims’ corrective-
justice rights. 
 The second wrongfulness-information example extends the first to a situation in which 
(1) the imperfectly-informed trier-of-fact knows that the situation was either a no-care or an 
individual-care situation, (2) the imperfectly-informed trier-of-fact knows that there is some 
possibility that the victim might have been the most-allocatively-efficient potential avoider and 





avoider, and (3) the relevant probabilities enable the trier-of-fact to divide the loss in a way that 
guarantees that the most-allocatively-efficient avoidance-move will be made, regardless of 
whether the potential injurer or the potential victim is the party in a position to make it.  Assume, 
in particular, that the trier-of-fact knows that (1) the loss is $100,000, (2) the avoidance-moves 
the injurer and victim in question could have made would not have affected the sum of tort-loss-
related risk costs that would be generated, (3) the economy is otherwise-Pareto-perfect, (4) if the 
potential injurer can prevent the $100,000 loss allocatively efficiently, he can do so for less than 
$80,000, and (5) if the potential victim can prevent the $100,000 loss allocative efficiently, he 
can do so for less than $15,000.  In this instance, any division of the loss between the potential 
injurer and potential victim that future counterparts of these parties can anticipate between 
($80,000 to the injurer and $20,000 to the victim) and ($85,000 to the injurer and $15,000 to the 
victim) will insure that allocatively-efficient avoidance-decisions will be made.  By way of 
contrast, a loss-division of $100,000 to the injurer and $0 to the victim—the division that a 
common-law judge will be obligated to order if the trier-of-fact concludes that the probability 
that the injurer was negligent was higher than 50% and that the probability that the victim was 
contributorily negligent was not higher than 50%—will fail to induce the victim to avoid when 
he is the potential most-allocatively-efficient avoider, and a loss-division of $100,000 to the 
victim and $0 to the injurer—the division that a common-law judge will be obligated to order if 
the trier-of-fact concludes that the probability that the injurer was negligent was not higher than 
50%—will fail to induce the injurer to avoid when he is the potential most-allocatively-efficient 
avoider. 
 The third wrongfulness-information example generalizes the second still further to 
situations in which no loss-diversion could guarantee allocative efficiency in an otherwise-
Pareto-perfect world because (if we assume for simplicity that the most allocatively-efficient 
avoidance-moves that might have been available respectively to the potential injurer and to the 
potential victims would have generated the same reduction in weighted-average-expected 
accident-or-pollution losses) the sum of (1) the highest cost that the potential injurer would have 
had to incur to generate that weighted-average-expected loss-reduction in the most-allocatively-
efficient way it could manage and (2) the highest cost that the potential victims would have had 





efficient way it could manage was not lower than (3) the weighted-average-expected loss-
reduction either’s most-allocatively-efficient avoidance-move would generate.  If in such a case I 
assume optimistically but in no way critically (1) that the judge has information about the 
probability that each party will be able to generate a $100,000 reduction in weighted-average-
expected losses by incurring avoidance-costs within each $1,000 internal between $0-$1,000 and 
$99,000-$100,000 and (for convenience) (2) that any actor who will be able to avoid at a cost 
within a given $1,000 interval will be able to do so at the $500 mid-point of that interval, the 
judge could determine the ex ante most-allocatively-efficient loss-division by starting with a 
loss-division of $100,000 to the victim and $0 to the injurer and asking whether ex ante 
weighted-average-expected allocative efficiency would be increased or decreased (a) by a shift 
from a $100,000/$0 to $99,000/$1,000 victim/injurer loss-division, (b) by a shift in the loss-
division from a $99,000/$1,000 victim/injurer loss-division to a $98,000/$2,000 victim/injurer 
loss-division and so on and so forth.  If for illustration we assume that there is a one-in-a-million 
chance—a (.0001)% probability—that the potential victim will be able to increase ex ante 
allocative efficiency by $99,500 by reducing the weighted-average-expected loss by $100,000 at 
an avoidance-cost of $500 and a one-in-a-hundred chance—a 1% probability—that the potential 
injurer will be able to increase ex ante allocative efficiency by $500 by reducing the weighted-
average-expected loss by $100,000 by incurring $99,500 in avoidance-costs, the net allocative-
efficiency effect of shifting from a $100,000/$0 victim/injurer loss-division to a $99,000/$1,000 
victim/injurer loss-division will be a gain of ([1%][$500]-[.0001%][$99,500]=$5-$.995=$4.005).  
The judge would then repeat this calculation for each additional shift about which he had 
information and pick the loss-division that involved the total shift associated with the highest net 
gain.  Although the loss-division that this approach reveals to be ex ante most-allocatively-
efficient might be the $100,000/$0 or $0/$100,000 victim/injurer loss-division that corrective 
justice would warrant in this kind of case, I suspect that this will be true only rarely. 
* * * 
 We have just seen that, for twelve sorts of reasons, the common-law decision that would 
be ex ante most-allocatively-efficient for a judge or jury to make may not be consistent with our 





rights-based societies to decide common-law tort cases by making allocatively-efficient rulings 
that are not required by the relevant society’s corrective-justice commitments. 
 
3. The Various Non-Common-Law Components of the Positive Tort Law of a Liberal, 
Rights-Based State: Their Moral Status (Legitimacy) and Likely Generic Desirability 
 
 Even liberal, rights-based societies that have a common law of torts will or may also have 
other types of tort-related law: (A) constitutional tort law, (B) legislatively-promulgated tort law 
that is constitutional, (C) (non-corrective-justice-based) judicially-created tort law promulgated 
by judges to whom legislative power has not been delegated by the legislature, (D) 
administrative-agency-created tort law promulgated by agency officials who have not been 
authorized to legislate by the legislature, and (E) (non-corrective-justice-based) new tort law 
promulgated by judges or administrative-agency officials who have been authorized by the 
legislature to create the law they promulgated.  Part 3 (1) analyzes the moral status (legitimacy) 
of all those possible components of the tort law of a liberal, rights-based society—i.e., analyzes 
the relationship between such law and the society’s liberal, moral-rights commitments, (2) 
discusses the substance of the corrective-justice-securing and non-corrective-justice-securing 
tort-related law a liberal, rights-based society’s legislature might be obligated to enact or might 
properly enact, and (3) comments on the generic desirability, rights-considerations aside, of 
legislatures’ authorizing judges and administrative-officials to promulgate tort legislation that 
will have only prospective application. 
 
A. Constitutional Tort Law 
 
 In my judgment, the governments of rights-based States are obligated to make their best 
efforts to maximize the rights-related interests of those for whom they are responsible.  This 
premise implies that the governments of a liberal, rights-based State are obligated not only to 
avoid committing torts against the moral-rights holders for whom they are responsible but also to 
make their best efforts (1) to minimize the extent to which their society’s members and 
participants commit torts against each other and (2) to maximize the extent to which victims of 
tortious wrongdoing can obtain redress from those who have violated their tort rights (or, when 
these two goals cannot be achieved simultaneously, to minimize some function that equals the 





                                                
interest “harm” done when tort victims do not have an appropriate opportunity to secure redress 
from their wrongful injurers). 
 Before proceeding, I should point out two important implications of my description of the 
basic obligations of the governments of any rights-based society.  The first is that, in my 
admittedly-contestable and certainly-contested judgment, all the concrete moral and 
constitutional rights of the members of and participants in a rights-based society are prima facie 
rights in that they need not be protected if the government could protect them only by sacrificing 
the rights-related interests of relevant rights-holders on balance.55  Of course, in a society as 
wealthy as the contemporary United States, I doubt that this qualification has much practical 
significance—e.g., I doubt that the government will be able to justicize (render just) its failure to 
secure a relevant concrete tort-related right by arguing that the right’s sacrifice was necessary to 
enable it to provide additional resources to relevant moral-rights bearers who needed them to be 
in a position to take their lives morally seriously (would critically affect the government’s ability 
to make such transfers to these individuals by saving allocative transaction costs or increasing 
allocative efficiency in other ways).  The second implication of my description of the basic 
obligation of a rights-based State’s governments is that the governments of any rights-based 
State cannot justicize its failure to protect some individual’s tort-related moral right when this 
choice will not secure relevant rights-related interests on balance by demonstrating that the 
choice in question would further the achievement of various perfectly-legitimate non-rights-
related moral goals. 
 In short, in my judgment, the members of and participants in a liberal, rights-based 
society have a constitutional right that their governments make their best efforts to secure their 
tort-related rights in all ways that will do so without sacrificing relevant rights-related interests 
on balance.56  As I have already indicated, one way in which such governments can fulfill this 
 
 
55 For my justification for this position and my response to various well-know arguments against it made by 
highly-respected philosophers, see Richard S. Markovits, Precommitment Analysis and Societal Moral Identity, 81 
TEX. L. REV. 877, 915-21 (2003). 
56 In the United States, I would deem this right to be one of the unenumerated rights to which the Eighth 
Amendment refers and one of the privileges or immunities to which the Fourteenth Amendment refers.  Others 
might argue that it has a textual basis in the “due process” clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments and is 
manifest in the Sixth Amendment’s right to trail by jury.  For an excellent, thorough account of the history of the 
idea in American thought that our governments are morally and constitutionally obligated to protect the moral rights 





                                                                                                                                                            
obligation is to pass legislation creating common-law courts authorized to secure the tort-related 
corrective-justice rights of the society’s members and participants and structuring the associated 
legal procedures in ways that both (1) give potential plaintiffs and potential defendants 
appropriate access to justice and (2) make it appropriately likely that correct legal conclusions 
will be reached.  Obviously, however, the governments of a liberal, rights-based State could also 
fulfill this obligation by enacting a tort statute that “legalized” its members’ and participants’ 
tort-related corrective-justice rights and provided them with appropriate opportunities to secure 
their legal rights.57  In addition, I suspect that the governments of a liberal, rights-based State 
may be constitutionally obligated to do more than merely give tort victims who have corrective-
justice rights an appropriate opportunity to obtain redress by securing compensation from 
injurers whom they can prove more probably than not violated their rights by making choices 
that were the but-for cause of their loss.  For example, I think that the governments of a liberal, 
 
Status of Tort Law: Blackstone, Due Process, and the Place in Liberal Political Theory of a Law for the Redress of 
Wrongs (unpublished manuscript, 2005). 
57 Although this conclusion does imply that legislation that reduces the ability of tort plaintiffs to vindicate 
their rights by barring recovery for pain and suffering, capping overall damage-awards, creating stricter time-limits 
for the filing of tort suits, capping the contingency fees that tort-plaintiff lawyers can charge, etc., may be 
unconstitutional, it does not imply that such legislation is unconstitutional: tort defendants have moral rights as well, 
and some of these reforms might be morally-acceptable responses to the tendency of triers-of-fact to make errors of 
various kinds that unjustly favor tort-plaintiffs.  The text’s conclusion also has possible implications for the 
constitutionality of the decision of the legislatures of a liberal, rights-based society to allow tort-liability insurance 
and to permit tort-related-rights violators to avoid compensating their victims by going bankrupt:  This, if a liberal, 
rights-based society’s members and participants have a rights-related interest in their wrongful injurers’ 
compensating them and realizing no profits from their wrongdoing, tort-liability insurance would be justicizable 
only if it served the relevant victims’ tort-related interests on balance. Tort-liability insurance also affects potential 
victims’ tort-related rights-related interests by increasing the proportion of their losses they will be able to recover 
and having an uncertain effect on the amount of tortious wrongdoing that takes place in the society in question.  
Although it is generally assumed that tort-liability insurance encourages tortious wrongdoing by reducing the private 
cost to potential avoiders of rejecting avoidance-moves whose rejection will render them liable, this effect (1) is 
reduced by deductibles and the dependence of future premiums on past pay-outs made on behalf of the insured and 
(2) may be more or less offset by such insurance’s possible tendency to prevent potential tortfeasors from 
committing torts (A) by providing them with insurance-premium data that sheds light on the tort losses for which 
they will be held liable if they do not change their ways (by overcoming any tendency they have to commit torts 
because they underestimate this figure), (B) by providing insurance companies with an incentive to condition their 
coverage on the insured’s making certain safety-arrangements, and (C) by providing insurance companies with an 
incentive to do research designed to discover avoidance-moves that liberalism would require to be made once they 
were known.  Although I have not given this issue the attention it deserves, my inclination is to conclude that it 
would not be permissible for a liberal, rights-based State to pass a law allowing a tortfeasor to escape liability to his 
victim by going bankrupt unless it simultaneously agreed to compensate the victim for his loss or at least for that 
part of his loss that the tortfeasor could be induced to pay.  If the tortfeasor could be induced to pay some part of the 
loss only through methods that violated his rights, one might still say that the State should bear the loss the victim 
was unable to recover because the State refused to violate the tortfeasor’s rights.  Obviously, I recognize that this 





                                                
rights-based State have a constitutional obligation to pass legislation that would grant two classes 
of victims a right to obtain compensation from wrongdoers against whom they cannot establish a 
corrective-justice claim: 
(1) the class of individual victims whose attempts to secure compensation on a 
corrective-justice basis would be thwarted by their inability to identify their actual 
injurer—i.e., to identify the particular member of a set of wrongdoers whose 
wrongful choices inflicted the kind of recoverable loss the individual victim 
suffered on some moral-rights holders who more probably than not had harmed 
him—and 
 
(2) the class of individual victims who have suffered losses that were simultaneously 
and independently caused by the satisfaction of two or more sets of sufficient 
conditions at least one of which had a member that was a wrongful choice by a 
moral agent.58
 
More particularly, I think that the governments of a liberal, rights-based State are obligated to 
pass legislation that would entitle any victim in the first class to recover from each of his 
possible injurers a percentage of his loss equal to the probability that the injurer in question 
caused his loss.  Relatedly, I think that the governments of a liberal, rights-based State are 
obligated to pass legislation that would entitle any victim in this class to collect from the 
wrongful choosers in question a total sum equal to his total loss.  I also think that the 
governments of a liberal, rights-based State are obligated to pass legislation requiring the 
wrongful putative injurers in such cases who have not individually paid each such victim 
damages equal to his full loss to pay civil fines equal to the difference between the loss the 
victim sustained and the payment being made.59  Such legislation would have the additional 
advantage of preventing the loss from being distributed unfairly among the putative injurers and 
of deterring whipsawing tactics that may be allocatively-transaction-costly and may enable 
victims to secure payments to which they are not morally entitled. 
 
58 Admittedly, no-one has a right to be compensated by wrongdoers whose wrongful choices turn out not to 
“cause” (on any construction of “cause”) harm (other than the “abstract” harm that wrongful choices generate by 
showing disrespect for all their potential victims).  However, it does not seem to me that someone whose wrongful 
choice was a necessary element of a set of sufficient conditions for a loss’ occurring all of whose members were 
fulfilled is entitled to his moral luck—i.e., to benefit from the fortuity that the loss with his choice was associated 
would have occurred had he not made a wrongful choice that guaranteed its occurrence. 
59 Admittedly, it might be appropriate to adjust the civil fines in question to reflect the fact that the relevant 





 The governments of liberal, rights-based States are also morally obligated to prevent 
tortious wrongdoing by socializing its members and participants to treat each other with 
appropriate, equal respect and concern and providing them with the intellectual skills needed to 
make non-tortious choices. 
 Finally, the governments of liberal, rights-based States may also be morally and hence 
constitutionally obligated to pass legislation (1) to secure allocatively-efficient and/or life-of-
moral-integrity-opportunity-enhancing outcomes in the type of step-function loss cases 
previously analyzed and (2) to prevent mere-utility losses from being generated allocatively 
inefficiently or life-of-moral-integrity opportunities from being lost because relevant actors are 
misinformed.  In particular, the governments of a liberal, rights-based society will be obligated to 
pass such legislation when the preventable loss was a mere-utility loss unless its decision could 
reasonably have been thought to have been rendered morally desirable by its tendency to 
promote some legitimate, non-liberal distributive goal or some other type of defensible, non-
liberal social goal more beneficially than it could in any other way, and the governments of a 
liberal, rights-based society will be obligated to pass such legislation when the preventable loss 
was opportunity-to-lead-a-life-of-moral-integrity-related unless its decision secured rights-
related interests on balance (in comparison with the most-rights-related-interest-securing set of 
policies it could have adopted). 
 The point of this section is that, if the legislatures of a liberal, rights-based State fail to 
make their best efforts to secure the liberal, tort-related corrective-justice rights and rights-
related interests of their society’s members and participants by passing legislation, conceivably 
by authorizing administrative agencies to pass appropriate legislation, and by supervising the 
way in which judges and administrative hearing officers apply the law, individual moral rights-
holders whose tort-related rights have been sacrificed by these government failures will have a 
moral right to receive compensation from the government—a moral right whose constitutional 
counterpart would in principle be judicially enforceable, though in some instances imperfections 
in the information available to courts would lead them to be underenforced. 
 






                                                
 Tort law is the body of law that protects interests not protected by contract law or 
property law.  Conventionally, tort law includes not only (1) law that gives legal effect to 
victims’ tort-related corrective-justice rights but also (2) law that is designed to prevent the kinds 
of concrete losses that tortious wrongdoing can generate or to grant their victims the legal right 
to obtain compensation for such losses even when those losses are caused by human choices that 
are not wrongful.  This section is concerned not only with tort law in this broader sense but also 
with what might be called “tort-related law:” (1) law that is designed to decrease the allocative 
transaction cost of securing tort-related corrective-justice rights to any given extent, (2) law that 
is designed to increase the accuracy of the resolution of corrective-justice-based tort suits, (3) 
law such as bankruptcy law that is designed to secure a mixture of allocative-efficiency and non-
corrective-justice distributive goals that cannot be fully achieved without sacrificing tort-related 
interests (though the State can reduce and may be constitutionally obligated to reduce the 
disservice these laws do to such interests by compensating the bankrupt’s tort victims itself), (4) 
law that is designed purely to effectuate non-corrective-justice distributive norms,60 which may 
or may not disserve the corrective-justice interests of victims of tortiously-wrongful conduct and 
that therefore may or may not have to be combined with a State program to compensate the 
corrective-justice right-holders the primary policy harmed, and (5) law that is designed to further 
the parochial interests of its supporters—law that may or may not (fortuitously) be desirable 
from any defensible normative perspective and that may be unconstitutional on that account, 
regardless of whether it disserved any tort-related interest that is constitutionally protected.  I 
have included this section for two reasons: (1) to acknowledge that the body of law 
conventionally called tort law and a fortiori the body of law that I am calling tort-related law 
contain law that is not designed solely to secure the corrective-justice and corrective-justice-
related rights of actual and potential tort victims and (2) to set up the remaining sections of Part 
3, which focus on the moral status (inter alia, the moral permissibility) and likely generic 
desirability (rights-considerations aside) of tort law that is  not created by common-law courts or 
legislatures that are exercising their respective authorities. 
 
60 For an explanation of why such laws may be the most desirable way to effectuate such norms, see Richard 
S. Markovits, Why Kaplow and Shavell’s “Double-Distortion-Argument” Argument Is Wrong, ___ GEO. MASON L. 





                                                
 
C. Non-Corrective-Justice-Based Tort Law Created by Judges Whom the Legislature Has 
Not Authorized to Exercise Legislative Power 
 
 Many contemporary law professors and a significant number of contemporary judges are 
moral-rights skeptics—indeed, dismiss moral-rights discourse as mumbo-jumbo.  Some who take 
this position do believe in the coherence of legal argument—indeed, believe that legal argument 
can yield unique, correct answers to all legal-rights questions, but their view of the set of legal 
arguments that can produce such answers represents law as an arcane practice in which moral-
rights considerations play no role.  However, most contemporary law professors and judges who 
are moral-rights skeptics do not believe that legal argument can generate unique answers that are 
right as a matter of law and maintain that judges should decide cases to promote various non-
moral-rights-related goals—i.e., should operate as social engineers.  Many tort scholars and 
judges belong in this latter group.  Some such as Professor Fleming James and Judge Roger 
Traynor recommend that judges resolve common-law tort cases in the way the would maximize 
the extent to which the loss is spread.61  Others such a Professor William Prosser recommend that 
judges resolve common-law tort cases in the way that will produce “the greatest happiness for 
the greatest number.”62  And still others such as Professor (now Judge) Richard Posner argue that 
such cases should be decided in the way that maximizes economic efficiency.63
 I began this section with the preceding paragraph to forestall the reaction that no-one 
would think that it was morally permissible or desirable for judges to usurp legislative power by 
creating truly-new law (which did not secure the plaintiff’s right to corrective justice) that would 
promote some arguably-desirable social goal.  If my non-systematic experience is a reliable 
guide, this reaction is mistaken—many contemporary law professors think that judges should act 
as social engineers. 
 In my view, in any type of rights-based State, it would be morally impermissible for 
judges who have not been authorized to legislate by the legislature or the People to promulgate 
 
61 For an account of James’ position, see John C.P. Goldberg, Comment: Misconduct, Misfortune and Just 
Compensation: Weinstein on Torts, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 2034, 2045-50 (1998).  For Traynor’s position, see Roger J. 
Traynor, The Ways and Meanings of Defective Products and Strict Liability, 32 TENN. L. REV. 363, 366, 369, 375-
76 (1965).  These cites are taken from Goldberg, op. cit. supra note 56 at n. 382. 
62 WILLIAM L. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS §3 at 15, 17 (1st ed. 1941). 





                                                
new law to achieve the social good even if they applied the new law they promulgate only 
prospectively.  Moreover this conclusion would hold a fortiori for such judges’ usurping the 
power to create such truly-new law and then applying it retrospectively as well as prospectively. 
 Regardless of the moral norm from which a given society derives its moral-rights 
conclusions, usurpations of political power violate the moral rights of the individuals who have 
the right to exercise or delegate that power.  In a liberal, rights-based society (which is 
committed to treating all its members with appropriate, equal respect and concern), the 
empowered group consists of all society-members who have the capacity to make the relevant 
choices in a minimally competent fashion.  This conclusion is a corollary of the basic duty such a 
society is committed to fulfilling since that duty requires that each member of such a society 
have an equal, appropriate opportunity to be the author of the laws that will govern him (an 
admittedly-hard-to-operationalize concept that I believe is clearly violated by usurpations of 
political power).64
 Moreover, if judges apply retrospectively any truly-new law they create, their decision to 
do so will fail to show the respect that is owed the loser of the case in question by subjecting him 
to ex post facto legislation: even if such judicially-created legislation is not designed to punish 
personal or political enemies or to deter personal or political opposition, it disrespects its victims 
by failing to give them fair notice of the law they will be sanctioned for violating. 
 I should add that, for at least three reasons, even if judicial usurpation of social-
engineering power were morally permissible in a liberal, rights-based State (i.e., did not violate 
the usurping judges’ obligations and the rights of “the People”), it would probably be generically 
a bad idea.  First, the training and professional experience of judges, the staffs that are available 
to them, and the decisionmaking procedures they are constrained to use make it less likely that 
they will perform social-engineering functions better than will legislatures or administrative 
 
 
64 Admittedly, one might argue that, given the reality that our actual political system falls far short of 
instantiating this liberal political-opportunity norm, judicial usurpation of political power might equalize the 
opportunity of society-members to influence the laws that will govern them because the individuals who have a 
higher-than-average ability to influence judicial social engineering have a lower-than-average ability to influence 
legislative and executive-branch social engineering.  I question the accuracy of this empirical premise, am confident 
that its accuracy would decline if judges engaged more in social engineering, and have doubts about the legitimacy 
of taking this type of second-best approach to rights-violations: am inclined to think that—when political 





                                                                                                                                                            
agencies.  Although many of the courses that students take in law school expose them to moral-
rights and other sorts of normative analyses even when taught by professors who claim that such 
analyses have no role to play or do not play an important role in legal argument and lawyers in 
their professional practices often make arguments that are either explicitly normative or are 
based on moral understandings (e.g., arguments about whether historical argument should be 
broad-gauged or narrow-gauged), law schools do not train people to be social engineers and (I 
suspect) would be unlikely to do so as well as the public-policy schools, economics departments, 
and sociology departments that are increasingly likely to have trained administrative-agency 
personnel even if judges engaged in a lot more social engineering than they do at present.  
Although the preceding comparative disadvantage of judges might be offset in the short run by 
the lower likelihood that they would be “politically corrupt” in both a narrow and broad sense of 
that expression, I expect that any corruption advantage would diminish through time if judges 
increasingly performed a social-engineering role since this change in role would lead to changes 
in the kind of people who compete for judgeships and the processes through which and criteria 
by which judges are selected.  Second, at least if one believes that there are internally-right 
answers to some tort-law questions and that cases in which such answers exist should be 
controlled by them, there is a risk that judges who choose to legislate in cases in which the only 
answer that is right as a matter of law is the rule that a plaintiff loses if he cannot establish more 
than a 50% probability that he is legally entitled to a verdict in his favor may choose to ignore 
the answer that is correct as a matter of law in cases in which the plaintiff or defendant can 
establish his legal right when the judge considers that internally-right answer to the legal-rights 
question to be wrong as a matter of policy.  Third, if one thinks that rights-based societies of 
moral integrity are more morally desirable than goal-based societies of moral integrity, judicial 
usurpations of legislative power will also tent to be generally undesirable to the extent that they 
undermine the public’s consciousness of the distinction between the right and the good and 
derivatively its rights-commitedness. 
 
D. Tort Law Created by Administrative-Agency Officials Who Have Not Been Authorized 
by a Legislature or the People to Perform This Function 
 







 I want to make five points about such law.  First, in a rights-based society, 
administrative-agency usurpation of legislative power is equally-rights-violate as judicial 
usurpation of legislative power.  Second, if administrative “regulations” truly do create new law, 
the retrospective application of such new law will be equally-rights-violative as the retrospective 
application of judicially-created new law.  Third, the formal training and professional experience 
of administrative-agency officials, their ability to specialize, the staff that is available to them, 
and the procedures that they can use to create new law give them a comparative advantage over 
judges and possibly over legislatures at engaging in social engineering.  Fourth, the 
specialization of administrative agencies may make them more vulnerable to capture than either 
legislatures or courts of general jurisdiction.  And fifth, the concern that judges who are also 
supposed to adjudicate cases that raise issues for which there are internally-right answers will be 
less likely to perform this function properly if they act as social engineers in other situations will 
be equally salient in the administrative-agency context only if the agency officials who engage in 
social engineering are administrative hearing officers—i.e., only if within the agency the 
legislative and adjudicatory roles are not assigned to different personnel and institutions. 
 
E. Non-Corrective-Justice-Based Tort Law Created by Judges or Administrative-Agency 
Officials to Whom the Legislature Has Delegated Such Power 
 
 Legislative redelegations of legislative power to judges or administrative-agency officials 
raise only one issue not already considered: the moral permissibility and related constitutionality 
of the redelegation itself in a rights-based society.  Regardless of whether it would be wise for 
them to do so, I suspect that it would not be morally impermissible for the members of a liberal, 
rights-based society to authorize state officials who also function as judges or administrative 
interpreters and appliers of legislation to promulgate new law that would apply exclusively 
prospectively.  However, although the American public appears to have acquiesced to its 
legislatures’ redelegating their legislative power to administrative agencies, I do find such 
redelegations morally problematic in rights-based societies if they are not explicitly authorized 
by the People regardless of whether the delegation is to an administrative-agency official or a 










 Virtually all academic analyses of the relationship between “morality” and the content of 
American tort law take one of four tacks that I find unsatisfactory.  Some such analyses claim 
that moral argument of any type is irrelevant to the determination of the answer to any tort 
question that is correct or a matter of law.  I find this approach unsatisfactory because it is 
inconsistent with the combination of the fact that the United States is a rights-based State of 
moral integrity and the axiom that, to be morally legitimate, both legal argument in a given 
society and the law of that society must be consistent with the society’s moral commitments.  
Other analyses claim that moral argument is relevant to the determination of the internally-right 
answer to any tort-law question only if the relevant moral principle is explicitly approved in the 
case-law or cited by some applicable statute (or perhaps provides the best account of the 
conclusions reached in the relevant cases or explicitly mandated by the relevant statute).  I find 
this approach unsatisfactory not only because—since Lochner65—American judges have 
hesitated to include reference to moral principles in their opinions but, more fundamentally, 
because it assumes that legal practice is self-legitimating (because it ignores the fact that even a 
consistent legal practice can be morally illegitimate and legally invalid if it is inconsistent with 
the moral commitments of the society in question [because it ignores the fact that, although a 
society’s legal discourse, conduct, and perceptions from part of the data-base from which one 
must determine its moral type, moral character, and specific moral commitments, such legal data 
form only a small part of the relevant data-base, which primarily consists of data on the society’s 
members’ prescriptive-moral discourse, conduct, and perceptions outside of legal fora]).  Two 
other sets of tort-law scholars contend that moral argument is relevant to the determination of the 
answer to a tort-law question that is correct as a matter of law even when the moral argument in 
question has never been used by a judge in a tort-law case or referenced by a statute—indeed, 
claim that moral argument is not only relevant to the determination of the internally-right answer 





                                                                                                                                                            
questions.  One set of such scholars think that the type of moral argument that plays this 
determinative role is purely-conceptual, so-called foundationalist argument from which one can 
derive objectively-true, universally-applicable norms of justice that determine the right answer to 
all tort-law questions.  I reject this approach partly because I have never been convinced by any 
such foundationalist argument and partly because much statutory tort law is not designed to 
effectuate justice—is designed not to secure the corrective-justice interests of relevant moral-
rights holders but to achieve various defensible social goals or the parochial interests of its 
supporters.  The other set of such scholars think that the type of moral argument that controls the 
internally-right answer to tort-law questions or the answer that should be given to such questions 
(1) given that there never is an internally-right answer to any question of law or (2) when there is 
no internally-right answer to a particular question of tort law is an argument that derives it 
conclusion from a moral norm whose instantiation the author favors but whose objective moral 
superiority or optimality (he admits) cannot be established.  I reject this approach for three 
reasons: (1) because I believe that there are internal-to-law correct answers to all tort-law 
questions in the United States, (2) because I believe that the response that is the internally-right 
response to a tort-law claim in the United States that is based on the plaintiff’s corrective-justice 
and corrective-justice-related rights is the response that is required by the American commitment 
to protecting liberal moral rights—a commitment that must be inferred from a philosophically-
informed empirical analysis of our society’s members’ and governments’ prescriptive-moral 
discourse, conduct, and perceptions and that may require legal outcomes that are inconsistent 
with those favored by the relevant scholar’s preferred personal value, and (3) because I believe 
that the response that is the internally-right response to a tort-law claim in the United States that 
is based on a statute that does not violate any affected party’s moral rights and is designed to 
secure some defensible social goal or the parochial interests of its supporters is (roughly 
speaking) the response that will most further that social goal or those interests, which may also 
not be the response favored by the relevant scholar’s preferred personal value. 
 This Article proceeds from different conclusions about the relevance of moral argument 
to the determination of the internal-to-law correct answer to tort-law questions in different 
societies.  It begins by distinguishing between two types of prescriptive-moral argument—moral-
 





rights arguments about the just (which derive their conclusions from moral norms I call “moral 
principles”) and moral-ought arguments about the good (which derive their conclusions from 
moral norms I call “personal ultimate values”).  It then argues that, although some societies do 
not draw a strong distinction between these two types of argument, other societies (so-called 
rights-based societies) do.  After that, it develops a protocol for determining whether a society is 
a rights-based society or a goal-based society and another protocol for identifying the moral 
norm that any society of either type is committed to instantiating.  Next, it asserts that the United 
States is a liberal, rights-based society of moral integrity and delineates (1) the basic obligation 
of such a society’s members, participants, and governments and (2) the more concrete tort-
related corollaries of that basic obligation.  In the course of executing these last analyses, the 
Article explains (1) why the common law of torts of any liberal, rights-based society that has 
common law will be exclusively concerned with protecting the liberal tort-related corrective-
justice and corrective-justice-related rights of its members and participants, (2) why a liberal, 
rights-based society that does not fully secure its members’ and participants’ tort-related rights 
through the common law is constitutionally obligated to do so statutorily, (3) why a liberal, 
rights-based State’s corrective-justice-securing tort law may not be allocatively efficient, (4) why 
a liberal, rights-based State may be morally and constitutionally obligated to protect its members 
and participants from losses that they cannot recover in contract law or property law when they 
also cannot establish or do not have a corrective-justice tort claim for compensation, (5) that a 
liberal, rights-based State may legitimately respond to loss-contingencies in ways designed to 
achieve various non-corrective-justice goals so long as their efforts to do so do not sacrifice 
rights-related interest on balance, (6) that decisions by judges in rights-based States to create 
non-corrective-justice-securing tort law are morally impermissible and hence unconstitutional 
absent authorization from the legislation or the People, morally impermissible and hence 
unconstitutional even if authorized if the new law is to be applied retrospectively, and 
generically of dubious desirability, moral rights and constitutional considerations aside, (7) that 
decisions by administrative-agency officials to create tort law are morally impermissible and 
hence unconstitutional if not authorized by the legislature or the People, and (8) that legislative 





administrative-agency officials are morally and hence constitutionally dubious absent an explicit 
ex ante vote of the People authorizing such redelegations. 
